Voting Squared: Quadratic Voting in Democratic Politics by Posner, Eric A. & Weyl, E. Glen
Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 68 | Issue 2 Article 3
3-2015
Voting Squared: Quadratic Voting in Democratic
Politics
Eric A. Posner
E. Glen Weyl
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Election Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by
an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, Voting Squared: Quadratic Voting in Democratic Politics, 68 Vanderbilt Law Review 441 (2019)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol68/iss2/3
Voting Squared: Quadratic Voting in
Democratic Politics
Eric A. Posner*
E. Glen Weyl**
Conventional democratic institutions aggregate preferences poorly.
The norm of one-person-one-vote with majority rule treats people fairly by
giving everyone an equal chance to influence outcomes but fails to give
proportional weight to people whose interests in a social outcome are stronger
than those of other people. This problem leads to the familiar phenomenon of
tyranny of the majority. Various institutions that have been tried or proposed
over the years to correct this problem-including supermajority rule, weighted
voting, cumulative voting, "mixed constitutions," executive discretion, and
judicially protected rights-all badly misfire in various ways, for example, by
creating gridlock or corruption. This Article proposes a new form of political
decisionmaking based on the theory of quadratic voting. It explains how
quadratic voting solves the preference-aggregation problem by giving proper
weight to preferences of varying intensity, how it can be incorporated into
political institutions, and why it should improve equity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Groups frequently make collective decisions through majority
rule. Legislators pass bills by majority; shareholders make most
corporate decisions by (share-weighted) majority rule, as do the
directors they elect; clubs, university faculties, and civic associations
typically use majority rule as well. The reason that they do so is not
entirely clear. Majority rule seems fair-and certainly is fairer than
rule by one (dictatorship) or a minority. But majority rule is not
obviously fairer than rule by unanimity or consensus, or rule by a
supermajority like two-thirds. Majority rule has some useful
properties, but it often fails to advance the good of the group.
The basic problem with majority rule is well-known: majorities
can disregard the legitimate interests of minorities. Imagine, for
example, that a community is trying to decide whether to devote funds
collected from taxes to build a park. A large minority, including
elderly people and families with young children, would benefit greatly
from a park; a bare majority does not have strong views but, on
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balance, does not want to spend the money. The majority can block the
park even if the minority gains more from the park than the majority
loses: there is no mechanism for ensuring that the majority takes into
account the minority's disproportionate interests. For example, if the
minority consists of 10,000 people who value the park at $100 each,
and the majority consists of 11,000 people who disvalue the park at $2
each, the majority prevails even though the park would generate a net
social product of $978,000. More troublesome examples are easy to
imagine and occur throughout history. In politics, majority rule, when
unrestricted by constitutional protections, permits the majority to
expropriate the property of the minority, throw them in jail, and
deprive them of franchise rights. Even when the majority respects
basic rights, it may deprive minorities of benefits and privileges that
are available to others. The most prominent example from recent
years, which we discuss in some numerical detail below, is the claim
that the majority of Americans in various states unfairly deny the
legal benefits of marriage to same-sex couples.'
The possibility that the majority may disregard the interests of
the minority has a well-known label: "tyranny of the majority."2 But
what is wrong with tyranny of the majority? One could argue that
tyranny of the majority is just a negative label for "democracy," a label
wielded by special interests, privileged groups, and others who fear
majority rule. If all citizens are equal, what could be fairer than
allowing the majority of them to determine policy, either directly or
through representatives?3
1. The Tyranny of the Majority, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 2009,
http://www.economist.com/node/15127600, archived at http://perma.cc/4F5G-267B.
2. The concept of tyranny of the majority is as old as majority rule, as will be discussed;
early users of the phrase include, among others, John Adams; Alexis de Tocqueville, who
popularized it; and John Stuart Mill. See generally 3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1797), reprinted in 5 THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 333, 333-35 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851); ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Penguin Putnam 2004)
(1835); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press
2003) (1859). Many formulations of it exist, of course. E.g., THOMAS PAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON
GOVERNMENT; THE AFFAIRS OF THE BANK; AND PAPER MONEY 11 (1786) ("[D]espotism may be
more effectually acted by many over a few, than by one man over all.").
3. A number of theorems illustrate the attractive features of majority rule but show that
it achieves good social outcomes only under narrow conditions. See generally Ted C. Bergstrom,
When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?, 81 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 216
(1979) (analyzing the efficiency of majority voting); Howard R. Bowen, The Interpretation of
Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources, 58 Q.J. ECON. 27 (1943) (showing that majority
voting produces an efficient output of a public good only under limited circumstances); Kenneth
0. May, A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision,
20 ECONOMETRICA 680 (1952) (setting forth four conditions necessary for the use of majority
voting as a group decision method); Douglas W. Rae, Decision-Rules and Individual Values in
2015] 443
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But there are good reasons to be worried about tyranny of the
majority. The first reason is that majority rule, unless constrained to
prevent tyranny of the majority, will not necessarily advance the
public good. Majority rule can lead to the systematic transfer of wealth
or resources from a minority to the majority. 4 From the standpoint of
the public interest, such systematic transfers are sometimes justified
(for example, transfers from rich to poor), but they need not be.
Further, nothing about majority rule guarantees that such transfers
will promote public well-being. The transfers may go from one morally
arbitrary group to another-for example, election winners to election
losers, or poorer people to wealthier people, or black people to white
people. Often these transfers incur substantial waste both
administratively and in separating goods from the owners that most
value them.5 Moreover, because the harm from being trapped in a
minority is so great, people will struggle to form coalitions that
constitute a majority, a high-stakes game that consumes time and
resources that could be more productively spent elsewhere.
There are actually two distinct problems here that are often
merged together. In the United States, tyranny of the majority usually
refers to the systematic and repeated use of the political process by a
relatively stable majority (such as white people) to pass legislation
that benefits itself at the expense of a "discrete and insular" minority
(such as black people).6 It might be thought that majority rule is less
troublesome when groups "take turns" playing a role in the majority.
For example, if whites and Latinos outvote African-Americans on a
bill proposed this year, but then African-Americans have a chance to
form a coalition with Latinos to outvote whites next year, and so on,
one might believe that tyranny of one majority does not take place.
But whatever label one uses, majority rule is still not optimal. The
reason is that if the white-Latino coalition inefficiently expropriates
Constitutional Choice, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 40 (1969) (providing a normative analysis of
"majority-rule" and other "decision rules"); Michael J. Taylor, Proof of a Theorem on Majority
Rule, 14 BEHAV. SCI. 228 (1969) (setting forth a mathematical proof based on Douglas W. Rae's
analysis of majority rule). The large literature on voting rules is surveyed in DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003); KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, ANALYZING POLITICS (2d. ed. 2010);
and other volumes. Lurking in the background is Arrow's theorem, which proves that under
relatively broad conditions, no voting system can produce outcomes that are both Pareto-efficient
and nondictatorial. Arrow's theorem assumes ordinal preferences; the quadratic voting system
we discuss below does not.
4. Jon C. Elster, On Majoritarianism and Rights, 1 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 19, 21 (1992).
5. There are countless historical examples of the violent transfer of resources from a
minority group to the majority; the expropriation of assets of Jewish citizens by the Nazi
government in Germany is the canonical example. See CONSTANCE HARRIS, THE WAY JEWS
LIVED: FIVE HUNDRED YEARS OF PRINTED WORDS AND IMAGES 328 (2009).
6. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY (1994).
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from African-Americans in year one by using inefficient legislation
that reduces public welfare, and the black-Latino coalition does the
same in year two, and so on, then majority rule-even if spread among
all groups rather than concentrated in a single group-makes possible
legislation that causes social harm that the political process should
avoid if possible. When this Article uses the term "tyranny of the
majority," it refers to this broader problem with majority rule systems,
and not just to the first case.7
The second reason for being worried about tyranny of the
majority is that majority rule can short-circuit democracy. If
democracy means that members of the public play a role in
governance, majority rule can subvert democracy by excluding even
large minorities from self-governance. The majority can entrench itself
by throwing up hurdles to political participation by minorities,
including gerrymandering districts, imposing censorship, raising the
cost of political organization, and even disenfranchising the minority.8
In these ways, temporary electoral successes can lead to a permanent
weakening of democratic institutions. Recently, tyranny of the
majority was the rallying cry of liberal groups in Egypt during the
administration of President Mohamed Morsi before he was
overthrown by the Egyptian army, in Turkey under President Recep
Erdogan, and in Russia under President Vladimir Putin.9 In Turkey
and Russia, minorities protested but made no headway; in Egypt, they
repudiated democracy because Egyptian democratic institutions did
not protect them.10
7. For example, suppose that proposed government projects routinely produce 100 for A,
100 for B, and -300 for C. Even if, over time, different people or groups take turns playing the
role of A or B or C, a system of majority rule that approved all of these projects would gradually
impoverish everyone, even if it did not single out any particular individuals or groups for
particularly burdensome treatment. The legal literature on judicial review (discussed below)
largely ignores this problem and focuses instead on settings where the same group always is
forced to take the role of C.
8. Elster, supra note 4, at 20.
9. James Traub, The Tyranny of the Majority, FOREIGN POL'Y, June 21, 2013, http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/21/the-tyranny-of-the-majority-brazil-turkeyprotests,
archived at http://perma.cc/Q868-2KFU.
10. See E.J. Dionne, Obama Embraces Democratic Realism Abroad, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 13,
2011, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-12-13/news/ct-oped-1213-dionne-20111213_1
human-rights-foreign-policy-state-hillary-rodham-clinton, archived at http://perma.cc/CY5E-
DYT7; Michael Kelley, Egypt Is Falling Apart on the Anniversary of the Revolution, Bus. INSIDER
(Jan. 25, 2013, 12:52 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/egypt-on-the-anniversary-of-its-
revolution-2013-1, archived at http://perma.ccNQ9C-UN3M; Laurence Norman & Joe Parkinson,
Erdogan Aims to Ease EU Concerns, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2014, 4:24 PM), http://
stream.wsj.comlstory/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-431363/.
2015] 445
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
For these reasons, both philosophers and practical politicians
have sought limits on majority rule so as to minimize or eliminate its
negative consequences." For the purpose of this Article, we will ignore
the extreme of autocracy or dictatorship, which has the obvious defect
of enabling the ruler to exploit the majority (as well as any
minorities). 12 But many other institutional arrangements are
consistent with the spirit behind majority rule, which reflects the idea
that the population should govern itself both because self-governance
leads to good outcomes and because self-governance is required by
fairness or democracy. These arrangements include supermajority
rules, bicameralism and separation of powers, weighted voting,
judicial review, representational democracy, and many others.
Unfortunately, they all have basically the same problem: they either
give insufficient power to minorities, allowing tyranny of the majority,
or they give excessive power to minorities, which leads to gridlock, as
well as unfair political outcomes. 13 No existing system calibrates the
power afforded to minorities to the strength of their interests in a
given policy decision.
A new type of voting system, however, offers a solution. Under
quadratic voting ("QV"), everyone votes on proposals (in the case of
referenda) or candidates by buying as many votes pro or con as they
want. The price they pay is the square of the number of votes they
buy. The amount collected is redistributed back to the voters on a pro
rata basis. As shown in a paper by one of us, QV guarantees outcomes
that maximize social welfare. 14 It avoids tyranny of the majority by
giving the minority the ability to buy extra votes, but because the
minority must pay a price per vote proportional to the votes they
purchase, it does not allow the minority to extract unfair outcomes or
cause gridlock.
Most likely, some readers will not take seriously a political
voting system that allows people to buy votes. There is a strong taboo
against vote buying, and one may worry that such a system will
benefit the rich at the expense of the poor. 15 However, this Article will
show that the taboo reflects the harmful effects of money in an
11. See infra notes 27, 29-32, and accompanying text.
12. However, dictatorships usually are supported by powerful minorities, which believe
that they would do worse under a system of majority rule. See DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A.
ROBINSON, ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 120-28 (2006).
13. See infra notes 26, 28-29, 31, 43, 45-46.
14. See Steven P. Lalley & E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Voting 2-3 (April 1, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
2003531, archived at http://perma.cc/Z5RA-RDSX.
15. Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1324-26 (2000).
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ordinary political system, such as one-person-one-vote majority rule,
and the logic of the taboo does not apply to QV.1 6 Moreover, we will
show that QV would improve the equity of voting outcomes compared
to the status quo.
Part II sets the stage for quadratic voting by providing a brief
survey of efforts to develop voting and related mechanisms to solve the
problem of tyranny of the majority or, more specifically, ensure that
governments make decisions that advance the public good rather than
wastefully shift around resources among interest groups. This Article
shows how all approaches have significant difficulties, which explains
why democracy remains the "worst form of government except all
those other forms that have been tried," in Winston Churchill's
words.1 7 Part III explains how QV works, how it can be applied to
democratic politics, and why it is superior to other voting systems. A
brief conclusion follows.
II. THE PROBLEM OF INTENSE PREFERENCES IN DEMOCRACY
The long history of voting rules in political institutions shows a
huge amount of institutional experimentation. Voting rules and
procedures rarely incorporated one-person-one-vote majority rule.
They typically included rules and institutional features that deviate
from this baseline. While commentators frequently argue-with some
merit-that the purpose of the constraints on majority rule was to
protect powerful interests, they can also be understood in a more
positive light. They protected minorities with strong preferences from
policies that reflect the weak preferences of the majority.
A. Ancient Times
The earliest examples of institutionalized majority rule come
from Homeric, German, and Spartan assemblies, where the group
expressed its preference by acclamation, with the presiding officer
declaring the outcome.' 8 Rule by acclamation (rather than ballot) may
have been convenient for an illiterate population (though the use of
ballots does not require literacy), but an interesting, and apparently
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. Winston Churchill, 444 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) (1947) 207 (U.K.).
18. John Gilbert Heinberg, History of the Majority Principle, 20 Am. POL. SCI. REV. 52, 55
(1926). In Sparta, "[t]he loudness of the cry was judged by men shut up in a house near the
Apella, from which they could hear the cry, but could not see the assembly." Id.; see also MELISSA
SCHWARTZBERG, COUNTING THE MANY: THE ORIGINS AND LIMITS OF SUPERMAJORITY RULE 21-25
(2013) (discussing acclamation systems).
2015] 447
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intentional, feature of rule by acclamation is that it permits people to
express the intensity of their preferences by shouting or murmuring.
An intense minority could outshout a waffling majority, at least as
long as the minority is not too small.19 The aggregate level of sound in
this way reflects both the number of voters and the intensity of their
preferences. To be sure, people could act strategically by shouting
when they did not have strong opinions, but the publicity of the act
and the risk of being seen as a strategic actor may have limited the
value of this option.20
The purest form of democracy known to history was the
Athenian democracy of the fifth century B.C.2 1 Most government
power was held by the Assembly, which consisted of all (adult male)
citizens, regardless of their social status or property holdings.
Although magistrates, boards, councils, courts, and other offices and
institutions existed, their power was subordinate to that of the
Assembly. The Assembly could pass laws, issue decrees affecting
individuals, and punish political leaders with ostracism and other
sanctions, including death. Every member of the Assembly had one
vote, and majority rule prevailed.
But the Athenians were well aware of the dangers of majority
rule. In one famous incident during the Peloponnesian War,22 the
Assembly tried and condemned to death a group of generals for failing
to rescue survivors and recover the bodies of the dead after a naval
victory off the Arginoussai Islands; later, persuaded that a storm
prevented the generals from acting, the Assembly condemned to death
the generals' accusers. 23 The account left to us by Xenophon depicts an
out-of-control mob that, manipulated by demagogues and provoked by
a sympathetic survivor of the disaster, disregarded constitutional
norms.24
Greek thinkers often disparaged Greek democracy because the
masses of poor could outvote the smaller group of educated people in
order to effect wealth transfers or simply bad policies. Plato saw
19. Pasquale Pasquino, The Nature and Limits of the Majority Principle, BOOKS & IDEAS
Apr. 20, 2011, available at http://www.booksandideas.net/IMG/pdf/20110420_Pasquino-EN.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cclJ3KR-4796.
20. Matias Nunez & Jean-Francois Laslier, Overstating: A Tale of Two Cities 3 n.5
(THEMA, Working Paper No. 2010-05, 2010), available at http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/
documents/2010-05.pdf, archived at http://perma.ccWY7C-YFW6.
21. Heinberg, supra note 18, at 55-56.
22. XENOPHON, HELLENICA bk. 1, ch. 7, §§ 1-35 (Carlton Brownson trans., 1921).
23. MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF DEMOSTHENES 6
(J.A. Crook trans., 1999).
24. XENOPHON, supra note 22, at bk. 1, ch. 7, §§ 1-35.
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democracy as lawless rule of the mob.25 Aristotle held a more favorable
view of democracy but similarly believed that because the poor form
the majority, they will rule so as to advance their own interests rather
than the common good. In a famous passage, he suggested weighting
votes by property holdings, possibly as a way for reflecting preference
intensity. 26 The playwright Aristophanes satirized democratic
decisionmaking by citing examples of the poor outvoting the rich on
the raising of fleets, which the rich paid for while supplying the poor
with jobs as sailors.27 In Polybius' words, "By its violence and
contempt of law [democracy] becomes sheer mob-rule."28 Elsewhere, he
explains:
[T]he mob, habituated to feed at the expense of others, and to have its hopes of
livelihood in the property of its neighbor, as soon as it has got a leader sufficiently
ambitious and daring, being excluded by poverty from the sweets of civil honors,
produces a reign of mere violence. Then come tumultuous assemblies, massacres,
banishments, [and] redivisions of land ... 29
After their defeat in the Peloponnesian War, which was blamed
in part on the poor decisions of the majority, Athenians introduced a
more moderate form of democracy. They gave more power to
independent bodies, including a commission that proposed legislation
(the Nomothetai) and a People's Court, which had the power to strike
down decrees of the Assembly that violated the laws. Since the
members of all these bodies were selected by lot, the practical effect
was to require multiple majority votes involving different groups of
people, amounting to an implicit supermajority requirement (except in
rare cases where the median voter in both bodies had the same
political preference). Unlike members of the Assembly, members of the
People's Court were required to be over thirty years old and to take
oaths to uphold the law; these requirements would also have ensured
that the bodies differed in ideological composition. Other procedural
innovations-like requiring the Assembly to hold two meetings for
approval of treaties and other decrees-weakened the hand of the
majority by forcing it to sustain itself over a period of time.30 Yet these
25. PLATO, Socrates' Defense (Apology), in PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 3, 3-27
(Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Hugh Tredennick trans., 1987); PLATO, Republic, in
PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES, supra, at 575, 575-77.
26. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. 6, pt. III (Paul Negri & John Berseth eds., Benjamin
Jowett trans., 2000).
27. HANSEN, supra note 23, at 8.
28. POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES bk. 6, ch. 4 (Evelyn Shuckburgh trans., 1889), available at
http://www.perseus.tufts.edulhopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3Al999.01.0234, archived at
http://perma.cc/55XE-UYQA.
29. Id. at bk. 6, ch. 9.
30. HANSEN, supra note 23, at 307.
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procedures also led to gridlock, the great risk of supermajority rule, as
this Article will discuss shortly.31
Another way to protect the interests of the minority in a
majority-rule system is to give power to the agenda-setter or presiding
officer. In ancient Athens and especially Rome, magistrates could
sometimes thwart the will of the majority, especially when the
majority was subject to a fleeting passion, by announcing that the
gods disapproved of the voting date, or by manipulating the order of
the voting. 32 Both polities also gave discretion to magistrates, and they
could use that discretion to advance the common good when their
activities could not be observed and checked by the people. But giving
discretion to government officials created a new problem: they used
their powers to advance their own personal interests or the interests
of favored families, clans, or other groups.
The more significant development was the theory of the mixed
constitution, which was famously advocated by Polybius. 33 A mixed
constitution is one in which different social groups-typically, the
masses, the aristocracy, and a hereditary ruler-are given influence
over governance. The mixed constitution ensured that any group could
veto political outcomes that it disapproved of. In the Roman Republic,
for example, the Senate was dominated by aristocrats, while certain
important offices were reserved for plebeians. Assemblies gave
ordinary people a voice by virtue of their number, but electoral
procedures gave advantages to voters with greater wealth.34
The Roman Republic lasted centuries and was a spectacular
success by the standards of the time. Its mixed system effectively
created supermajority rule that ensured that ordinary people could
influence government policy but not expropriate the property of
smaller groups, including the wealthy, which limited conflict and civil
war for many centuries. 35 But the large number of veto points led to
gridlock, which powerful rulers from time to time resolved with
31. Id. at 308.
32. See J.A. North, Democratic Politics in Republican Rome, 126 PAST & PRESENT 3, 17
(1990) ("Above all, they exercised an exclusive control as magistrates, senators and priests over
the ceremonial of public religious activity, and hence over access to the gods and to divine
legitimation of all human activities.").
33. POLYBIUS, supra note 28, at bk. 6; see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 26, at bk. 3
(discussing the nature and intricacies of different types of constitutions).
34. POLYBIUS, supra note 28, at bk. 6.
35. See SCHWARTZBERG, supra note 18, at 39-46.
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extraconstitutional acts, leading eventually to civil war, dictatorship,
and then empire.36
B. The Modern Period
1. The Attractions of Supermajority Rule
The next step in the development of voting systems took place
in Italian communes in the Middle Ages. 37 To elect their leaders, these
communes used supermajority rules: sometimes requiring unanimity,
but usually two-thirds or some other fraction considerably larger than
a majority.38
In other cases, the supermajority requirement was not explicit
but was effectively implemented by other types of rules. In the Roman
Catholic Church, canon law provided that many decisions would be
made by majority rule, but a complicated set of laws permitted
outvoted minorities to appeal to higher officials and prevail if they
could persuade those officials that the majority vote was contaminated
in some way-by the personal interests or motives of voters in the
majority, or simply because it was wrong.39 Under the doctrine of
maior et sanior pars, a minority could outvote a majority if the
minority contained people with superior judgment, such as those with
greater experience and wisdom-a form of weighted voting that we
will discuss later.40 In England, the House of Commons began to use
majority rule in the fifteenth century, but Great Britain had a classic
mixed constitution, with the aristocracy able to exert power through
the House of Lords and the King able to act on his own. In practice,
political outcomes must have satisfied an implicit supermajority rule
(putting aside Cromwell's dictatorship). 41
What accounted for the growing popularity of supermajority
rule? A plausible answer is that supermajority rule allows the
36. See Eric A. Posner, The Constitution of the Roman Republic: A Political Economy
Perspective 31 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 540; Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law
& Legal Theory Working Paper No. 327, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1701981,
archived at http://perma.cclEND6-X4L5.
37. Heinberg, supra note 18, at 57-58; Arthur M. Wolfson, The Ballot and Other Forms of
Voting in Italian Communes, 5 AM. HIST. REV. 1, 3 (1899).
38. Heinberg, supra note 18, at 58; Wolfson, supra note 37, at 5. Supermajority rules also
existed in ancient times-and effectively in Rome as noted above-but became more explicit in
this period. See SCHWARTZBERG, supra note 18, at 44-46, 49-51.
39. Heinberg, supra note 18, at 5960.
40. SCHWARTZBERG, supra note 18, at 52-58; John Gilbert Heinberg, Theories of Majority
Rule, 26 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 452, 456 (1932).
41. See Goronwy Edwards, Presidential Address, The Emergence of Majority Rule in the
Procedure of the House of Commons, 15 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. Soc'Y 165 (1965).
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majority to govern while giving some protection to people with intense
interests when they are unable to form a majority coalition.
Supermajority rules protect large minorities, and thus they enable
people with intense preferences to block acts that harm them if they
form a large enough minority or a large enough minority coalition
with other interests. Supermajority rule may thus seem like an
improvement over majority rule. 4 2 One can thus speculate that
supermajority rules appealed to political leaders, constitutional
framers, and the general public for two reasons. First, people in the
majority today know that they may be in the minority tomorrow. They
give up the chance of prevailing by a weak majority in return for
gaining the ability to block weak majorities. This tradeoff may reduce
the risk of purely redistributive but inefficient outcomes that favor one
group sometimes and another group at other times, giving no one a
net gain, while reducing total wealth over time. Second, people with
intense preferences who are repeatedly victimized in the political
process have strong incentives to rebel or secede; supermajority rule
institutionalizes their power so that it flows through peaceful political
channels.43
Stronger rules, like rule by unanimity or consensus, also can
block tyranny of the majority, but they suffer from a significant
disadvantage: gridlock. The advantage of unanimity rule is that
projects are possible only if they benefit all members of the group. The
disadvantage is that any individual can hold out, preventing a project
from being approved unless she receives a payoff from other members
of the group. Since other individuals face the same incentives,
everyone can hold out, resulting in impasse and failure. 44 This is why
unanimity rule is rarely used in political groups. When it is used, it
supports only the thinnest forms of cooperation. 45 International
institutions frequently use unanimity rule or variations of it. Action
by the U.N. Security Council requires unanimity among the five
permanent members.46 The Law of the Sea Authority also uses
42. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution,
80 TEX. L. REV. 703 (2002), who build a constitutional theory around the ideal of supermajority
rule.
43. Supermajority rule developed in certain contexts where it favored those in power (at
least, relative to majority rule). See SCHWARTZBERG, supra note 18, at 59-70. The bias toward
the status quo would clearly benefit those who did well in the status quo.
44. See George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, Asymmetric Information Bargaining
Problems with Many Agents, 57 REV. EcoN. STUD. 351 (1990), for a formalization of this
argument.
45. Stephen Zamora, Voting in International Economic Organizations, 74 AM. J. INT'L L.
566, 574 (1980).
46. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3.
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supermajority rule and vetoes to protect the largest countries. 47
Because of mutual suspicion between governments, the risk of
decisions that benefit some states at the expense of others is
considered intolerable. This risk is minimized with strong decision
rules that also cause gridlock, which is considered a reasonable price
to pay.4 8
Holdout is less of a problem under supermajority rule than
under unanimity rule, but supermajority rule is more cumbersome
than majority rule, as experience in the U.S. Senate shows. The recent
crises over the debt ceiling show the holdout power created even by
relatively weak minority protections, which enable a determined
minority to block projects supported by the majority even when these
projects are clearly in the public interest.49  Furthermore,
supermajority rules do not prevent a "conservative" tyranny of the
majority in which legislation bringing great benefits to a minority
(such as civil rights laws for racial or ethnic minorities, or same-sex
marriage for gays and lesbians) is blocked by a majority. Indeed,
supermajority rules discourage minorities from forming coalitions
with each other to advance their interests by raising the size of the
coalition needed to pass new legislation. Still, supermajority rule may
be a tolerable compromise that reduces the worst excesses of tyranny
of the majority without shutting down government altogether.50
Supermajority rule takes many forms. Sometimes, it is explicit;
sometimes, other voting rules effectively require a supermajority. It
can stand alone, or it can be joined with still other rules that protect
particular interests. The U.S. Constitution, drafted by politicians who
were intensely aware of the history of democratic institutions and
their problems, contains numerous examples of supermajority rules. A
supermajority of the Senate (two-thirds) must approve a treaty before
47. See Eric A. Posner & Alan 0. Sykes, Voting Rules in International Institutions, 15 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 195, 217-19 (2014).
48. Majority rule exists in bodies like the General Assembly and the U.N. Human Rights
Council, which lack the authority to make law, and international judicial bodies, which generally
gain jurisdiction only with the consent of affected states. See id. at 197, 204.
49. Brad Plumer, Absolutely Everything You Need to Know About the Debt Ceiling, WASH.
POST WONKBLOG (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.comblogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/04/
absolutely-everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-debt-ceiling/, archived at http://perma.cc/
8LH8-ZS4Z.
50. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 96-116 (1962). But see Anthony J. McGann, The
Tyranny of the Supermajority: How Majority Rule Protects Minorities, 16 J. THEORETICAL POL.
53, 66-67 (2004) (arguing that supermajority rule provides less protection to minorities than
majority rule does because it makes it difficult for minorities to form coalitions with other
minorities to advance their interests through new legislation).
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a president can ratify it.51 Two-thirds of each house are necessary to
overcome the president's veto. 52 These are all explicit examples of
supermajority rule. 5 3 It is commonly said that one of the purposes of
the constitutional drafters was to protect minorities-for example, the
minority of Americans living in the South or in rural areas, or
creditors, or those with substantial property holdings.54 A better way
of putting this point is that the Founders realized that these groups
had intense interests but, because they were minorities, could not
depend on majority rule to protect them. Supermajority rule was thus
necessary to provide such protection because a constitutional order
would not survive without the support of these groups.
Another example is bicameralism. At first sight, the
requirement of a majority in both houses in order to pass a bill may
seem like a (double) example of majority rule rather than
supermajority rule. But a simple majority in the House and a simple
majority in the Senate will normally be possible only if a
supermajority of Americans approves the policy. The reason is that
different groups of people elect representatives and senators. Except
under unusual conditions, the median voter of one group and the
median voter of another group will be different, which means that a
supermajority of one group or the other will be necessary to approve
the bill.55 And because the president can veto a bill and the courts can
strike it down, there remain additional points where minorities may
be able to block legislation. This can happen if the minority manages
to elect the president (which is difficult but not impossible) or exerts
influence over the judiciary or elements of it (which can occur when a
long-dominant party that has made many judicial appointments
finally loses power). In this way, the federal system can protect a
national minority that dominates a state from legislation that the
national government might like to impose because authority to
legislate for that policy area lies with the state. Today, a temporary
political majority-even one that captures the presidency and both
houses-must contend not only with the courts but also with an
51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
52. Id. art. I, §7; see also ELIZABETH RYBICKI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22654, VETO
OVERRIDE PROCEDURE IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 1 (2010), available at http://www.senate.gov/
CRSReports/crs-publish.cfm?pid=%270DP%2BP%2CC%3E%23P%20%20%OA-37k, archived at
http://perma.cc/78RR-SLLT.
53. See generally JOHN 0. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE
GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013) (describing supermajority rules in the Constitution).
54. See ROBERT DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 12-18 (2d. ed.
2003).
55. See John J. Coleman, Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party
Responsiveness, 93 AM. POL. Sol. REV. 821, 824 (1999).
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entrenched bureaucracy, which can block popular legislation that it
disapproves of, or water down its effect.56
Even dictatorship, oligarchy, and aristocracy can be systems
designed to protect minority interests. Oligarchy classically protects
the interests of the wealthy minority; aristocracy protects the
interests of ancient families or other groups with historical privileges.
Dictatorships often rest on the support of powerful minorities that fear
rule of the majority-for example, the Sunnis in Iraq under Saddam
Hussein (where the majority consisted of Shiites) 57 and the Christians
and Alawites in Syria under Hafez and Bashar al-Assad (where the
majority consists of Sunnis).5 8
Constitutional systems can also protect minority interests by
giving them more votes. The U.S. Constitution did just that by giving
slaveholding states extra representation in the House based on the
number of slaves in their populations-the notorious Three-Fifths
Compromise.59 This rule protected states with intense minority
interests (in the preservation of slavery) from the weaker interests of
a majority of states (in the abolition of slavery). The rule that states
elect two senators regardless of the size of their population can also be
understood as one that gives greater voting power to people in low-
population states, again protecting intense minority interests.
Similar rules can be found in corporate governance today.
Shareholders with larger stakes in a corporation have more votes than
shareholders with smaller stakes, and voting is typically based on
number of shares owned rather than shareholder status. Voting
systems in international organizations like the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund also give more weight to countries that
contribute the most money to those organizations, thus protecting
56. Various other rules, some in the Constitution, others customary, protect minority
interests. An interesting class of such rules are "submajority" voting rules, which give minorities
extra power to protect themselves by giving them some control over the agenda. See ADRIAN
VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL 85-115 (2007).
57. Tony Karon, Understanding Iraq's Ethnic and Religious Divisions, TIME, Feb. 24, 2006,
available at http://content.time.com/time/worldlarticle/0,8599,1167476,00.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/5NWW-V1MG.
58. Olga Khazan, Who's Fighting Whom in Syria?, WASH. POST WORLDVIEWS (Oct. 18,
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/10/18/whos-fighting-who-in-
syria/, archived at http://perma.cc/GM24-E7CU.
59. Or, looked at differently, it gives greater weight to northern states given that two-fifths
of the slave population in southern states were not counted. In other words, if the baseline is
that the South should have voting power in the national government that is commensurate to its
fraction of the total national population, the rule gives extra voting power to the North; if the
baseline is that the South should have voting power in the national government that is
commensurate to its fraction of the national voting population (thus excluding slaves), the rule
gives extra voting power to the South.
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their contributions from expropriation by the poorer countries that
form the majority of their membership.60
John Stuart Mill argued that educated people should be given
more votes than uneducated people because educated people
understand the public good better than uneducated people do. 6 1
Others defended property qualifications, arguing that people with
property are autonomous rather than dependent on others and so can
exercise the vote based on their independent judgment. 62 Similar
reasoning justified the denial of the franchise to women, who were
thought to lack the judgment to make political decisions and were
otherwise protected by the votes of their fathers or husbands, as well
as to the inhabitants of colonies, who were believed incapable of self-
government because they lacked intelligence or proper traditions.63 In
all these cases, the fear was that a virtuous or wise minority with
strong interests would be outvoted by the more numerous ordinary
people who would have greater voting power under unweighted
majority rule.
Weighted voting is rarely used today in political decisions. The
older justifications are now seen as biased, bigoted, and plain wrong.
But, even putting aside the questionable empirical assumptions of
their proponents, weighted voting is not a good means of protecting
minority interests. 64 The problem is that people with extra votes can
use those votes to advance their interests even when those interests
are weak and affected less by a policy than others are. The problem is
familiar in corporate governance: people who own multiple shares of a
60. Yet another example is consociationalism, a constitutional form where different groups
(for example, different religious or ethnic groups) are guaranteed proportional representation in
government, including in the executive, and decisions are usually made by consensus. Examples
include Lebanon and Bosnia and Herzegovina. John Calhoun advocated a type of
consociationalism when he argued that the United States should have a dual executive
consisting of a Northern and Southern representative. See generally Arend Lijphart,
Consociational Democracy, 21 WORLD POL. 207 (1969).
61. See JOHN STUART MILL, THOUGHTS ON PARLIAMENTARY REFORM (1859), reprinted in 19
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL, 311, 323-29 (John M. Robson ed., 1977). In
common with modern approaches as well as empirical evidence, we assume that people vote in
their self-interest, and hence the voting system must be designed so as to aggregate information
and preferences. However, strong empirical evidence suggests that the educated typically have
more intense information and preferences and thus might optimally receive, on average, a
greater weight. See RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 18 (1980).
62. See Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41
STAN. L. REV. 335, 340-42 (1989).
63. C.A. BAYLY, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN WORLD, 1780-1914 110-11 (2004); ALEXANDER
KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 5
(2009).
64. As advocated by IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 183-
86 (1990) (arguing that women should have a veto over issues that affect them).
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corporation, and therefore enjoy commensurate voting power usable to
protect their interests, can also use this same voting power to
expropriate value from other shareholders.65 For example, a person
who owns fifty-one percent of a corporation can in theory push
through a merger that benefits her because she owns the target
company and can insist on an above-market price, in the process
harming the owners of the other forty-nine percent. The courts try to
deter this kind of expropriation by giving minorities the right to
challenge the merger in court and obtain a fair valuation.66 However,
judges must then determine the value of the corporation-a hard
thing to do, and in tension with the idea that corporations should be
private in the first place.
Moreover, all major democratic systems are representative
democracies, not popular democracies, and representative democracy
protects minority interests to a greater extent than popular democracy
does.67 Representatives may themselves understand the dangers of
acceding to majority interests too easily; they may also be more
responsive to well-organized minorities, which can contribute cash,
than to the majority, which may have difficulty coordinating and
enforcing its interests. The Founders gave senators six-year terms in
order to insulate them from public opinion and enable them to check
the more democratically sensitive House.
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution recognized the dangers of
majority rule. During the period of the Articles of Confederation, state
governments broke contracts, redistributed wealth, and engaged in
other policies that benefited the majority at the expense of the
propertied minority.68 Aware also of the repeated attempts by Roman
political leaders like the Gracchi and Caesar to obtain power by
promising to redistribute wealth to the masses, the Framers
implemented numerous antimajoritarian rules in the Constitution.
65. See Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate
Governance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 251, 259-60 (2014).
66. See Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 455 (Del. Ch. 2011) (holding that
a corporation "must pay 'in cash' an amount equal to the 'fair value' of the fractional interests').
67. See, e.g., Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI.
245 (1997) (reviewing thirty years of civil rights actions and concluding that direct democracy
results in the minimization of the rights of political minorities).
68. See, e.g., WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION
4-8 (2007) (discussing states' overwhelming "attention to popular notions"); CALVIN H. JOHNSON,
RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 25-
27, 50-51 (2005) (discussing the objective of new government to protect individuals from
oppressive, self-interested actions of states); JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL
POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 390-96 (1979) (describing
states' acquiescence to majority as "injurious ... to the private rights of other citizens").
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These included several mentioned above: the separation of
government powers into three branches that exercise partial vetoes
and draw their power from different constituencies; the further
division of the legislature into an upper and lower house; numerous
provisions for the indirect election of powerful figures, including the
president and senators; the appointment of others, such as judges;
explicit supermajority voting rules; federalism; extreme supermajority
rules for amending the Constitution; and so on.69 These rules did not
just protect propertied interests from majority rule. They also
protected sectional interests, particularly those of merchants and
slave owners.
Some commentators celebrate this system of
supermajoritarianism, 70 but there is very little reason to believe that
it is optimal or even close to optimal. For one thing, even if rule by
supermajority is superior to rule by majority, the range of
supermajority rules between majority and unanimity is infinite. No
one has any idea whether the optimal supermajority rule is fifty-one
percent or ninety-nine percent or somewhere in between, and the
optimal rule could vary for different areas of policy, and over time in
response to demographic changes.7 ' And then it is possible (if decision
costs, and hence the risk of gridlock, are high enough) that pure
majority rule, or even submajority rule, is better than supermajority
rule. Whatever the merits of supermajority rule, it is clearly a very
crude way to protect minority interests. A particular minority may not
have enough votes even under supermajority rule to block adverse
legislation, while another minority may have enough votes to block
legislation that benefits the public interest and does not harm the
minority or does so very little. 72 A minority of thirty-two percent
cannot protect itself under a two-thirds rule, and a minority of thirty-
four percent can threaten to block legislation that benefits the public
unless given a payoff.
Thus, for all its popularity, supermajority rule is
fundamentally flawed. It protects intense minority interests only
when those interests are held by enough people to form a blocking
minority. It enables minorities with weak (or strong) interests to block
69. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1293-97 (2012).
70. Notably, McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 42.
71. Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator
Problem, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 195, 195-214 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2012)
(discussing slide scale and supermajority rules as applied to constitutional amendments).
72. See McGann, supra note 50 (arguing that supermajority rule can hurt minorities by
raising the costs of forming coalitions with other minorities in order to overturn laws passed by
majorities).
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laws that benefit the majority more than it harms the minority-
creating gridlock. And it does not help people with strong interests
when the status quo harms them. In fact, it hurts them by making it
more difficult for them to cobble together a large enough majority with
other groups in order to change the status quo.
All of these problems influenced the development of American
constitutional law. In response to the problem of gridlock, the U.S.
constitutional system gradually adjusted itself. Power shifted away
from the states and to the national government; and, within the
national government, away from Congress and to a large bureaucracy
controlled by the executive. 73 Gridlock nonetheless remains a
significant problem today.74
The problem of the status quo harming minorities with intense
interests created even greater difficulties. Racial, ethnic, and religious
minorities have all suffered from discrimination in day-to-day life, and
could not obtain legislative relief because they were outvoted. In many
cases, particularly that of African-Americans, voters in the majority at
the state level supported laws that weakened or eliminated the
franchise of the minority. When African-Americans finally joined with
northern whites to form majority coalitions at the national level in the
1940s and 1950s, supermajority rules protected the rights of another
minority-southern whites-at African-Americans' expense, as
southern senators used the filibuster to defeat civil rights legislation
that enjoyed majority support among the public.75 Supermajority rules
in this case entrenched a conservative minority, blocking reforms that
would tremendously benefit a smaller minority.
2. Judicial Review of Legislation
In the second half of the twentieth century, federal courts
stepped in to rectify the problem of tyrannical conservative majorities
(or large minorities) by recognizing the rights of minorities to effective
political representation. This would turn out to be the greatest
contribution of American legal and political thought to the problems of
majority rule. Of course, the original Constitution used the language
of rights, but the Constitution was not oriented toward the problem of
73. See generally ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER
THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010) (discussing the rise of executive power).
74. Ezra Klein, In Washington, Gridlock Is More Costly than Crisis, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Aug
10, 2011, 8:00pm), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2011-08-11/in-washington-gridlock-is-
more-costly-than-crisis-ezra-klein, archived at http://perma.cclV9SV-9K56.
75. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PASSAGE OF POWER 75-78
(2012) (describing the battles over civil rights legislation).
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minority racial and ethnic groups. Even if religious rights appeared in
the First Amendment, it was not clearly understood from the
beginning that the courts would have a strong role in preventing the
majority from passing laws that harm minority religious groups.
Today, judicial enforcement of the political rights of politically
vulnerable minorities is taken for granted.
The doctrine that courts developed for this purpose is complex;
a simplified description will be adequate here. Laws are
presumptively enforceable because they reflect the will of the
majority.16 But if they burden historically vulnerable minority groups
(or "suspect classes," an ill-defined concept that at least includes racial
and ethnic groups), then a court will strike them down unless the
government can provide a strong and persuasive reason that the
burden is justified by the public gains.77 In practice, courts approve
such laws only if, at a minimum, they are designed to benefit rather
than harm the minority group (affirmative action)78 or, in the case of
religious groups, do not target minority religious practices.79
This approach is firmly entrenched in American legal thought,
with disputes only along the margins. A small literature objects that
the preoccupation with rights distorts political discourse, but this view
has exerted little influence.80 Long-standing worries that judicial
review interferes with democratic values, blocks publicly beneficial
legislation, and leads to backlash have never gained a foothold.81
Conservatives and Republicans originally opposed the extension of
judicially enforced rights to minorities in the 1950s and 1960s but
today accept the principle that laws with racial classifications are
unconstitutional.
We can see the problems with judicially enforceable rights
anew by considering them from the perspective of the problems with
majority rule. Recall that the major advantage of majority rule is that
76. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
77. See, e.g., id. at 450 (finding that permit requirements for a nursing home for the
mentally ill rested on an "irrational prejudice" against residents).
78. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (holding the special
admission program constitutional for benefitting those based on race).
79. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding the state may deny
unemployment compensation to those who use peyote for religious reasons when the law does not
attempt to regulate freedom of religion).
s0. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 1-17 (1991) (discussing the increased societal focus on express values in terms of
rights). For a discussion and criticism of this view, see STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE COST OF RIGHTS 158-61 (1999).
81. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON (2008); JEREMY
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 184-86, 285-87 (1999).
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it facilitates laws and other public projects that advance the well-
being of most of the public (reflected by the interest of the median
voter) by minimizing bargaining costs (relative to supermajority rule
or rule by unanimity or consensus). However, the disadvantage is that
it permits majorities to expropriate from minorities and forces all
groups to expend resources in struggles to avoid exclusion from the
majority coalition. At first sight, judicially enforceable rights seem like
an ideal solution. They permit the majority to continue to legislate for
the public good, while prohibiting them only from passing laws that
harm minority interests.
But this argument is too crude. It reaches its conclusion by
assuming that only two kinds of laws exist: those legitimate laws that
advance the public interest without hurting the minority in any way,
or perhaps only trivially, and those illegitimate laws that benefit the
majority only through expropriation of minority interests. However,
most laws fall between these two extremes. These laws both plausibly
benefit the majority and harm a minority. Consider some familiar
examples:
* A gang-loitering or stop-and-frisk law that reduces crime but
disrupts the lives and activities of mostly minority men.8 2
* A toughening of visa requirements that reduces illegal
immigration but also disrupts cross-border relationships of
immigrants and their foreign relatives and friends.83
* An anti-same-sex marriage law like Proposition 8, which
reinforces traditional notions of marriage supported (at the
time) by most Americans but that deprives gays and lesbians of
advantages enjoyed by opposite-sex couples. 8 4
* Sanitation and antidrug laws that interfere with religious
rituals of minority religious groups.
* Money-tracing laws that restrict money laundering and
terrorist financing but burden Americans of Arab descent who
do business in the Middle East.
82. Matthew McKnight, The Stop-and-Frisk Challenge, NEW YORKER, Mar. 27, 2013,
available at http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-stop-and-frisk-challenge, archived at
http://perma.cc/Z5EB-LHVH.
83. US Tightens Student Visa Rules After Boston Marathon Bombings, TELEGRAPH (May 3,
2013 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamericalusa/10037 147/US-tightens-
student-visa-rules-after-Boston-Marathon-bombings.html, archived at http://perma.cc/49ZQ-
BKM7.
84. California Proposition 8, the "Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry"
Initiative (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/California-Proposition_8,the_%22
Eliminates Right of Same-SexCouples-toMarry%22_Initiative(2008), archived at http:/l
perma.cc/B6EC-VSSG (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
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* Voter identification laws that reduce voting fraud and enhance
confidence in elections, but deter voting among the poor.85
* Zoning laws that enhance public spaces and increase property
values, but drive out a small number of low-income residents
who cannot afford higher rents.
* Reduction of public funding for inner-city projects (mainly
hurting low-income African-Americans) for the benefit of
taxpayers generally.
* Eminent domain projects where a city forces the sale of several
private properties, possibly at below value to the owners, in
order to build a park or revitalize the downtown.
People hold different and often strong opinions about these
laws, but the laws all pose the same dilemma. A particular law helps
(or plausibly helps) the majority and possibly the public at large,
including even the affected minority, or certain members of it. But the
law also puts a burden on the minority, a burden that may seem
unfair and in some cases sufficiently egregious as to throw into doubt
the desirability of the law in question. The question repeatedly arises:
At what point do the benefits enjoyed by the majority justify the
burdens imposed on the minority?
The Court's approach is plainly simplistic. Some laws do not
explicitly discriminate against minorities-and might not be
motivated by animus-and yet may impose a burden on minorities
that is unfair or excessive. Critics of many of the laws described above
make this argument. A stop-and-frisk law may make sense in theory,
they say, but it puts an excessive burden on minorities.86 And, at least
in theory, there may be laws that explicitly burden a minority that
may be publicly justified. The dissenting Justices in United States v.
Windsor held that view about the Defense of Marriage Act, which
denied federal marriage benefits to same-sex couples who were legally
married under state law.8 7 Finally, laws that explicitly or implicitly
discriminate against minority groups, who are not suspect classes
because they were not historically discriminated against, may
nonetheless be highly objectionable from a social standpoint since they
expropriate benefits from a group without producing equal social gain.
85. Suevon Lee, Everything You've Ever Wanted to Know About Voter ID Laws,
PROPUBLICA (Nov. 5, 2012, 5:50 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-youve-ever-
wanted-to-know-about-voter-id-laws, archived at http://perma.cc/J3PR-L78W.
86. See Injustices of Stop and Frisk, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2012, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/05/14/opinionlinjustices-of-stop-and-frisk.html?_r=0, archived at http://
perma.cc/3F4P-YGNT.
87. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709-11 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Such laws include those that discriminate against regional interests
(such as farmers or people living in small towns), social classes, or any
other group that fails to form a majority coalition, including
homeowners, national-park visitors, commuters, or parents with
young children.88
The Supreme Court has struggled with these questions, and in
recent years, the doctrinal structure has reflected these strains. Two
examples illustrate this problem well. First, in cases challenging laws
that burden gays and lesbians, the Court has refused to recognize this
group as a suspect class, so technically a discriminatory law is
constitutional as long as it is rational; under the conventional rules,
that would almost always be the case. Yet the Court has demanded
that governments provide substantial evidence that these laws
advance concrete interests-in health or order, for example, rather
than purely moral interests-and governments have had trouble
meeting this burden. However, if the rational-basis test ordinarily
required persuasive social-science evidence that a law advances a
particular interest, few laws would be constitutional. Social-science
evidence is usually extremely weak. The only really persuasive
evidence comes from randomized experiments, but these are costly,
rare, and difficult to generalize from. Observational studies, no matter
how high their quality, are easy to criticize, and usually a consensus
will come into place only after dozens have been performed.89 As a
result, the social-science evidence that could be cited to support even
laws that are widely accepted-say, imprisonment of burglars or
taxation of polluters-is weak, and when government embarks on
innovative regulatory projects, the evidence is often nonexistent. If
courts were to demand strong social-science evidence for any law that
was challenged, we would not have many laws. That is why the
rational-basis test was used in the first place. The Supreme Court
ended up striking down the Defense of Marriage Act on the ground
that opposition to same-sex marriage reflected "animus" when in fact
88. An oddity here is that courts rarely try to determine whether a particular group holds
political power on a case-by-case basis. For example, an ethnic or racial minority may be the
majority in a city that passes an ordinance that is challenged in court, but if the law incorporates
racial classifications that appear to burden that group, it will be subject to strict scrutiny. See
Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153,
1176-84 (1998) (arguing that Supreme Court doctrine that banned overly vague laws used for
crime control but capable of discriminatory enforcement should not be applied when minority
groups support those laws).
89. See Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yail Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 929, 938 (2011).
2015] 463
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
it reflected moral disapproval.90 It seems likely that the real basis of
the decision was the majority's view that DOIA imposed significant
burdens on one group of people that were not justified by whatever
advantages it might have had for others.
Affirmative action provides a second example. Affirmative-
action laws typically provide that African-Americans, Latinos, and
certain other minority groups receive special privileges, usually the
right to educational and employment opportunities that are denied to
others with superior qualifications. These laws sit uneasily with the
premise that rights protect minorities because the laws discriminate-
more-or-less explicitly-against various minority groups, such as
Asian-Americans, who are routinely denied educational slots for which
they are apparently qualified. 91 While doctrine permits explicit racial
classifications that serve a "compelling government interest," the type
of social-science evidence that courts normally require in these
circumstances fails to show that affirmative action benefits the
public.92 As a result, judicial support for affirmative action, never
enthusiastic to begin with, has been waning.93 Yet affirmative action
could be easily seen as a reasonable, pragmatic policy of the sort that
the government regularly experiments with, and justifiably so.
The basic divide in modern constitutional jurisprudence can be
seen from the standpoint of preference intensity. The liberal justices
on the Supreme Court worry about harms to the liberty or dignity
interests of racial and ethnic minorities, including African-Americans
and Hispanics, and vulnerable groups on the margin of society, such
as prisoners, indigent people, and political dissidents. 94 For these
reasons, liberal jurisprudence has centered on the Equal Protection
Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and the
First Amendment.95 The conservative Justices on the Court also worry
90. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (holding that the Defense of Marriage Act was
unconstitutional in part on grounds of improper animus).
91. Thomas J. Espenshade & Chang Y. Chung, The Opportunity Cost of Admissions
Preferences at Elite Universities, 86 SoC. SCI. Q. 293, 298 (2005).
92. See Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 382-85 (2004). Sander's paper has been challenged by other
scholars, see, e.g., Jesse Rothstein & Albert H. Yoon, Affirmative Action in Law School
Admissions: What Do Racial Preferences Do?, 75 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 649 (2008) (discussing
literature and criticizing Sander's analysis), but the relevant point here is that the positive
evidence for the effectiveness of affirmative action in promoting a well-defined government
interest is at best controversial.
93. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) (directing lower court to
reexamine an affirmative-action program).
94. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135-70 (1980).
95. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (holding that a state criminal abortion
statute that excepts only lifesaving procedures, without regard of other interests or stages of
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about majority exploitation, but they worry about the older type of
exploitation that the Founders worried about, namely, the
expropriation of property. Indeed, the conservative view that rights
are needed to protect property from expropriation long predates the
liberal view that rights are need to protect the liberty interests of
ethnic minorities and other vulnerable groups. Thus, the conservative
Justices have focused on strengthening the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which limits the power of the government to take
property or issue regulations that reduce property values, without
paying compensation.96 They have also used the First Amendment to
protect businesses from certain types of regulation of commercial
speech. 97 Even the recent development of gun rights can be seen as
protection for a passionate gun-loving minority.98 The liberals and
conservatives agree that tyranny of the majority requires a judicial
response, disagreeing only on which minorities deserve protection.
This disagreement in turn derives from assumptions about
whose interests are stronger. For conservatives, property owners have
strong and legitimate interests in the enjoyment of their property,
which is constantly being threatened by governments controlled by
lower-income people who seek redistribution. For liberals, various
minority groups and women have strong and legitimate interests in
not being discriminated against by governments frequently beholden
to white, male majorities.
Courts are in a difficult position. It is plausible that all these
people care deeply about their interests, but the real question is how,
in the context of specific controversies, to value interests that litigants
allege are strong and are badly harmed by laws and policies. The
actual extent to which people care about their property rights or rights
not to be discriminated against (for example, through excessive
stopping-and-frisking) is simply unknown. That information cannot be
pregnancy, violates the Due Process Clause); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719
(1971) (arguing that the vagueness of national security should not "abrogate the fundamental
law embodied in the First Amendment"); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (finding
that a citizen talking in a public telephone booth had an entitlement to assume privacy under
the Fourth Amendment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (concluding that the
public education doctrine of "separate but equal" is "inherently unequal" under the Equal
Protection Clause).
96. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702,
715 (2010).
97. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) (finding that restrictions on corporate
independent expenditures are invalid under the First Amendment); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (finding that the regulation of certain medical records violated the First
Amendment). Liberals have joined some of the commercial speech cases.
98. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding a ban on handgun
possession in the home a violation of the Second Amendment).
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elicited in a reliable way, and so judges must fall back on intuition or
social-science evidence that is almost always weak and contestable. 99
Judicial review also depends on judges being motivated to
protect minorities who actually lack political power and not the
majority or minorities that systematically prevail in the political
process because they are well-organized and influential. 00 But there is
no guarantee that judges will act in this way. Judges are appointed by
the government and, in practice, tend to advance the interests of
whatever government that appoints them. They end up protecting
minorities mainly because judges remain in power long after the
collapse of the coalition that supported the government that appointed
them.
Seen in this way, judicial review is just another form of
supermajority rule-one where the supermajority threshold is
effectively a function of political configurations from a generation
earlier.101 Minorities associated with Party X will have greater
supermajoritarian protection if Party X was in power in the recent
past; otherwise, they will not. The connection between judicial review
and supermajoritarianism is clearer in other countries. In most
countries, legislatures can overturn high-court constitutional
interpretations by passing laws, engaging in other procedures that
require a supermajority, or complying with rules that protect minority
interests. 102 And in the United States, as well as other countries, a
supermajority can usually reverse constitutional holdings through the
amendment process. 10 3 But, as we have seen, supermajority rule is a
crude and unsatisfactory way of protecting minority interests.
In the United States, judicial review owes its prestige among
liberals to the Supreme Court's actions in the 1950s through the 1970s
to protect minorities important to liberals that (not coincidentally)
99. See infra Part II.B.3 on the controversy over contingent valuation.
100. There are other criticisms of this approach (famously championed by ELY, supra note
94), focusing on the difficulty with determining whether a group has, in fact, been deprived of
political power or deprived to an excessive or unfair degree. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 717-18 (1985) (arguing that this understanding of
judicial review relies on "an increasingly unrealistic models of politics"); Laurence H. Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1072-77 (1980)
(noting the difficulties in distinguishing prejudice from principled disapproval by the majority).
101. Cf. Levinson, supra note 69, at 1293-97 (describing the Founders' rationale for our
system of government).
102. See Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & James Melton, The Lifespan of Written
Constitutions 38 (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Law & Econ. Workshop, Paper No. 3, 2008) available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/berkeleylaw-econ/Spring2008/3/, archived at http://perma.cc/BJ59-
7X25.
103. Id.
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composed part of the coalition that supported the Democratic Party. 104
At that time, conservatives argued that the Supreme Court should not
protect minorities but should defer to the political process.105 Today,
the prestige of the Supreme Court has risen among conservatives
because the Court increasingly protects minorities that conservatives
care about-property owners, businesses, and gun owners, among
others.106 These groups have played important roles in the Republican
coalition. Meanwhile, liberals increasingly argue that the Supreme
Court should be more deferential to the political process.107 Like a
pure supermajority rule, judicial review as practiced in the United
States provides minorities with an instrument for protecting their
interests, but unlike a pure supermajority rule, there is a temporal
component to judicial review because of the lag between the
appointment of judges and most of their rulings. 08
A final point is that it should be easy to see how judicial
review, if it can be properly practiced, reconciles democratic
commitments with the protection of minorities. The problem with
democracy is not so much that majorities win. It is that majorities win
when their interests are weaker than the interests of minorities. 09 If
judges can value the interests of minorities and protect them only
when they are stronger than the majority's interests, then striking
104. ELY, supra note 94, at 135-79.
105. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 407, 409 (1977); Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent,
and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 825 (1986); see also Steven G. Calabresi &
Lauren Pope, Judge Robert H. Bork and Constitutional Change: An Essay on 011man v. Evans,
80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 155, 156 (2013), available at
https://lawreview.uchicago.edulpage/judge-robert-h-bork-and-constitutional-change-essay-
olman-v-evans, archived at http://perma.cc/56W5-WR5L (noting Professor Berger's criticism of
Brown v. Board of Education as a "judicially activist opinion").
106. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 331-50 (1985).
107. E.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 219-226 (2004) (tracing the historic evolution of liberals' relationship with
theories of judicial restraint); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON
THE SUPREME COURT 24-45 (1999) (describing how judicial minimalism promotes democracy).
See generally MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS 93-150 (2010) (describing the
influence of politics on the Supreme Court).
108. For reasons of space, we have ignored other forms of minority protection that are
common in foreign countries, including proportional representation and other power-sharing
arrangements. For a brief discussion, see Sujit Choudhry, Bridging Comparative Politics and
Comparative Constitutional Law: Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES 3-40 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008); Levinson,
supra note 69, at 1307-11.
109. Compare BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 337-85 (2009), which argues, in
a similar spirit, that the Court retains public support by provoking debate over significant issues
rather than systematically ruling against the majority.
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down legislation may be inconsistent with majority rule. However, it
might be consistent with a more robust conception of democracy
oriented toward welfare maximization rather than the victory of the
majority over a temporary or entrenched minority. To the extent that
the public recognizes this, it will rationally lend its support in the long
term to a court that strikes down legislation.
3. Executive Discretion and Technocracy
There is yet another common method for aggregating
preferences in a way that takes account of those who have intense
preferences. In the United States and many other countries, policies
are frequently made by bureaucracies or government agencies rather
than by the legislature. These agencies have considerable discretion to
choose policies that advance the public good as a whole rather than
specific interests--or, in other words, the power to give greater weight
to intense preferences, even if held by only a minority, than to weak
preferences held by the majority. If they are controlled by the chief
executive, and if the chief executive has strong electoral incentives to
advance the public good, the agencies may be motivated to choose
regulations on the basis of aggregate preferences.1 10
The problem is knowing what those preferences are. Since the
1980s, U.S. regulatory agencies have increasingly relied on cost-
benefit analysis.111 Using cost-benefit analysis, an agency evaluates a
proposed regulation or project-like a pollution-control regulation-by
determining whether the public benefits exceed the (usually) private
costs. Costs can be easily determined: they are simply the financial
cost of installing a scrubber or supplying workers with protective
masks, plus costs attributable to lost sales if the price increases.
Determining benefits is trickier. If the regulation improves the quality
of air, the agency might determine benefits by calculating avoided
medical costs or property damage. But often the benefits include
general amenities (such as a clear rather than smoggy sky) or avoided
mortality, which are intrinsically hard to value.11 2 Agencies have
110. In a similar vein, prosecutorial discretion allows the executive to avoid prosecuting
people who commit morals crimes-acts that society disapproves of but that do not cause harm to
anyone-such as sodomy, prostitution, and drug use. The tradition was to tolerate this behavior
unless it was flaunted; in this way, the executive accommodated people with intense interests in
the activity while otherwise enforcing the weaker preferences of the majority. On prosecutorial
discretion generally, see WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1-
10(2011).
111. MAnITHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
11-12 (2006).
112. CASS SUNSTEIN, WORST CASE SCENARIOS 200 (2007).
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developed controversial methods for valuing these goods, such as
contingent valuation, where they simply ask people how much they
would be willing to pay for a public good.113
Cost-benefit analysis addresses the problem of intense
preferences by measuring them in terms of willingness-to-pay.
Suppose the question is whether to impose a strict or weak pollution
regulation. Asthmatics and others sensitive to pollution are willing to
pay a great deal for a low level of pollution, while other people are not.
The regulator aggregates the amounts that everyone is willing to pay
in order to determine the correct pollution standard. Even if
asthmatics form a small minority, their preferences will influence the
outcome by causing the regulator to choose a higher level of pollution
control than it would if it chose the optimum for the majority. In this
way, cost-benefit analysis improves on majority voting, which in this
context would result in no (rather than moderate) pollution control.
But cost-benefit analysis suffers from numerous problems. As
noted, while regulators can sometimes derive valuations from market
behavior, they often cannot precisely because government projects are
used to generate public goods where markets fail. 114 Even when
market valuations can be used, they reflect the preferences of
marginal, rather than average, consumers and so are extremely
sensitive to spurious factors, such as the state of technology.
Given these problems, agencies often run so-called "Contingent
Valuation" ("CV") surveys that ask individuals to report their personal
valuations for (usually public) goods.115 But because subjects do not
receive a payoff from answering truthfully, CV surveys cannot
guarantee that people answer questions honestly or after thinking
carefully about how public resources should be used. Empirical
evidence indicates that CV surveys deliver information of little
value.116
In addition, wealth disparities can distort the valuations
elicited by cost-benefit analysis; the rich are willing to pay more for
goods than the poor are, even when those goods do not make the rich
113. Id. at 201.
114. Id.
115. ROBERT C. MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS:
THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 2-16 (1989).
116. Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better
Than No Number?, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1994, at 45, 46 (arguing that contingent valuation
surveys "do not measure the preferences they attempt to measure"); Jerry Hausman, Contingent
Valuation: From Dubious to Hopeless, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2012, at 43, 43 (returning to issue
with new research and finding even less evidence of effectiveness).
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better off than the poor.117 And, finally, the executive branch of the
government is not necessarily well-motivated to use cost-benefit
analysis honestly. When President Reagan ordered regulators to use
cost-benefit analysis in 1981, critics argued that he was trying to
create bureaucratic hurdles to regulation.118 And then when President
Clinton renewed the order in the 1990s, critics argued that he did so
for public-relations reasons only, and that his agencies manipulated
cost-benefit analysis to rationalize decisions made on political
grounds.1 19 The underlying problem is that cost-benefit analysis
requires a certain amount of discretion and judgment. If elected
officials seek to advance the interest of the majority rather than the
general public, and can control the bureaucracy, then giving these
officials discretion does not solve the problem of tyranny of the
majority.
4. Summary
The fear of majority exploitation of the minority is best
understood in terms of the danger that people with weak preferences
about an issue determine policy that harms people with strong
preferences about that issue. Under majority rule with one-person-
one-vote, people with strong preferences will prevail if they happen to
form a majority, but if not, the policy outcome will reduce social
welfare rather than increase it. If those people with strong interests
systematically lose whenever a vote is held, outcomes will be deeply
unfair and inequitable, as well as inefficient. But even if they
sometimes win and sometimes lose, social welfare will decline rather
than increase over time.
Institutional designers have developed numerous ways of
solving this problem, including supermajority rules, weighted voting,
judicial enforcement of rights, and cost-benefit analysis. All of these
approaches are deeply flawed because they provide only crude
protection for people with strong preferences and often at the expense
of creating gridlock.
117. This is also an objection to our proposal, which we discuss infra Part III.D.
118. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 111, at 11-12.
119. See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1503, 1507 (2002);
see also Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209, 245-47 (2012).
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III. QUADRATIC VOTING
Unlike these other methods, quadratic voting aggregates the
preferences of a population in a way that gives proportionate weight to
the intensities of those preferences. It thus solves the tyranny-of-the-
majority problem, the major defect of majority rule, and it does so
without creating gridlock.
A. The Problem
Suppose that the legitimate purpose of government is to
advance the public interest, and that advancing the public interest
involves the welfarist goal of generating gains for individuals. Suppose
further that a public project can be legitimate even though it produces
losers as well as winners (as it inevitably will) as long as the winners
in aggregate gain a great deal and the losers in aggregate do not lose
too much-or as long as gains and losses are fairly distributed so that,
over the long term, everyone or nearly everyone gains on net. We do
not need to be specific about how gains and losses are aggregated, and
can acknowledge that large gains to the very rich may not justify
small losses to the very poor.
If the key difficulty with traditional voting rules is that they do
not give influence to people in proportion to the intensity of their
preferences, then the solution must address this problem in
particular. Political scientists and economists have proposed an
enormous variety of voting systems to do just that. The basic approach
of these voting systems is to allow people to cast more votes when
their preferences are intense. Few of these systems have been
implemented. The problem is that they are too complex for people to
understand, or too vulnerable to manipulation.1 2 0
120. The literature is vast; for a survey, see MUELLER, supra note 3, at 147-181; SHEPSLE,
supra note 3; see also Edward H. Clarke, Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, 11 PUB. CHOICE 17,
22-26 (1971) (proposing a complex system involving assigned prices, derived marginal supply
prices, determination of output, and determination of contributions); Theodore Groves, Incentives
in Teams, 41 ECONOMETRICA 617, 617-29 (1973) (proposing the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanism, which is too complex and vulnerable to collusion, and so has not been used despite
its canonical status). For a recent contribution, see Rafael Hortala-Vallve, Qualitative Voting, 24
J. THEORETICAL POL. 526, 529 (2011) (noting that alternatives to majority rule, including the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, are so complex as to undermine their applicability); William
Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8, 26 (1961)
(noting that "even the simplest of the non-symmetrical successive auction cases would involve ...
complications . . . [that] appear too formidable to go into here"). For criticisms of the canonical
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, see Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, The Lovely but
Lonely Vickrey Auction, in COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS 17-40 (Peter Cramton et al. eds., 2006)
(showing vulnerability to collusion); Michael H. Rothkopf, Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-
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It is useful to begin against the backdrop of the one institution
that awards goods according to the intensity of preference: the market.
In the market, people have different valuations for different goods;
when it works well, the market channels goods to those who value
them the most. In effect, the people who care more about certain goods
can express their interests in them to a greater extent than others and
thus exert a greater influence on the ultimate allocation of goods.
They do so, of course, by paying more money for those goods than
other people do. The price system forces people to make tradeoffs-to
sacrifice the power to make purchases in the future in return for the
power to make purchases today. In this way, the market enables
people to sincerely reveal the strength of their preferences in
ownership of various goods and obtain those goods that they value the
most. This is the famous logic of the "invisible hand" that ensures
markets provide efficient allocations, formally called the Fundamental
Theorems of Welfare Economics. 121
The market fails to provide public goods for a familiar reason:
those who pay for goods cannot prevent others from free riding.122
That is why a political system with voting rules is necessary. But the
analogy from the market suggests that we could protect the interests
of the minority by allowing people to buy votes or otherwise pay
money to influence the allocation of public goods.
Suppose, for example, that the government implements a vote-
buying system where people pay $1 to the government for one vote on
a project like the construction of a park, and people can buy and cast
as many votes as they want. The government builds the park if people
buy more votes for the park than against it. And if vote buying seems
improper, consider that it already takes place in corporations, where
investors can increase their influence over corporations by buying
shares and the votes that come with them (and even votes without
shares, subject to some minimal corporate-law constraints).1 23 It might
seem that one can generalize: if some people pay money to the
government in return for greater influence on political outcomes, and
money helps fund those outcomes for the benefit of others, then the
Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical, 55 OPERATIONS RES. 191, 193-94 (2007) (showing
manipulability).
121. DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 199-205 (1990).
122. Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. STAT. 387,
388-89 (1954).
123. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 814 (2006) (describing "new vote buying" in
which economic ownership and voting rights of shares have been decoupled).
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people who pay the most should have the greatest influence on
outcomes.
There are two problems with this scheme. The first is that it
gives the wealthy excessive influence over political outcomes. The rich
can buy more votes than the poor, and even if they end up paying
more for public projects, there is no guarantee that those projects will
advance the public good. The second problem-and our focus-is that
the proposal does not in fact give voters or vote buyers the right
incentives to cast their votes for projects that advance the public good.
To see why, consider a simple setup where the goal of the
government is to maximize the well-being of the public, as measured
by people's willingness-to-pay for public projects. A project should be
approved, for example, if its backers would be willing to pay in
aggregate $100 for its implementation while its opponents would be
willing to pay only $90 to block it. To evaluate projects, the
government must elicit people's willingness-to-pay, which is generally
private information. 124 People have strong incentives to exaggerate
their willingness-to-pay. A person willing to pay $10 for a project
might as well say that she would be willing to pay $20 or $100. Thus,
the government cannot elicit preferences simply by asking people
what they are.
What about the vote-buying scheme? Now people must pay
money, and the requirement that they pay might put limits on their
ability to exercise influence over outcomes that is disproportionate to
their interest in those outcomes. One might think that a person who
values a project like a park at $10 would offer $10 to the government
in return for ten $1 votes, and a person who opposes the park might
pay, say, $9 to block it. The government could aggregate the payments
(which could be put into its budget) and approve the project if people
buy more votes in favor of it than against it.
However, people would not act this way. Most people would
probably pay nothing for (or against) the park and instead free ride. A
person would reason that if she buys some votes, they will not affect
the outcome, especially if there are thousands of voters, while the
votes cost her something. And if she reasons farther along the chain of
outcomes, she might realize that others will think like her, in which
case maybe no one on her side will vote, in which case she would
waste money by voting. To be sure, she might realize that, based on
124. Willingness-to-pay is not always entirely private information; when governments
perform cost-benefit analysis, they estimate willingness-to-pay based on observed market
behavior. But cost-benefit analysis has well-known limitations and there is almost always some
component of private information. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 112, at 200.
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this reasoning, no one on the other side will vote either, in which case
her votes might make a difference. But it is quite unlikely that the
small probability of affecting outcomes, even given the behavior of
others, will give her the right incentives to buy votes.
An example will illustrate the argument. Consider two
members of a large population, Pro and Con. Pro expects to gain
$1,000 if the government implements a project, while Con expects to
lose $50 from the project. Each person can buy votes at $1 each. To
determine how many votes to buy, Pro must first estimate the
probability that she will be the pivotal voter and thus will affect the
outcome. She should not spend money on votes unless she can affect
the outcome; otherwise, she loses without gaining anything in return.
Suppose Pro estimates that for every vote she buys, she can increase
the likelihood of approval of the project by one percent, at least for a
range of votes. Thus, each vote has an expected benefit of $10. Pro will
buy a lot of votes and stop only when an additional vote increases the
probability of winning by less than one percent, which would happen if
and when Pro owns a large enough fraction of votes that the
additional expected impact of another vote declines to a low level.
Con, by contrast, will likely buy no votes. If he, like Pro,
expects that each additional vote will have a one percent impact, then
the expected gain from a vote is $0.50, while the cost is $1. Yet the
government wants to know Con's preference. If there is only one Pro,
but more than twenty Cons, the Cons in aggregate would be willing to
pay more than Pro does. But because the Cons pay nothing, the
government approves a project that reduces group welfare. In fact,
game theoretical analysis under a variety of assumptions has shown
that this simple voting scheme leads to the dictatorship of the single
individual with the most intense preference, as illustrated in this
example.125
The vote-buying scheme described will not work. It does not
force people to sincerely reveal their preferences, and so it will
produce outcomes that do not advance social welfare. It addresses and
overcomes the major problem of majority rule-that it does not enable
people to exert influence in proportion to the intensity of their
preferences-but only at the cost of replacing it with an even worse
system: dictatorship. While this scheme allows Pro, in a minority of
125. See Alessandra Casella et al., Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes, 120 J. POL.
ECON. 593, 599-611 (2012); Eddie Dekel et al., Vote Buying: General Elections, 116 J. POL. ECON.
351, 363 (2008) (providing this example and noting the issue of nonpivotal voters in the efficiency
of vote buying); Eddie Dekel et al., Vote Buying: Legislatures and Lobbying, 4 Q.J. POL. SCI. 103,
108-20 (2009) (modeling the lobbying process via a complete-information game).
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one, to prevail over the many Cons when Pro's preferences are
sufficiently intense, it does so even when the Cons should prevail
because of their large numbers. Yet the hypothetical vote-buying
scheme also makes clear why conventional voting is problematic.
Conventional voting provides no method for people to reveal the
strength of their interests. One casts a single vote and can do no more.
B. Quadratic Voting
Recently, one of us proposed a variant of vote buying that
solves the problems we have been discussing. 126 Under Quadratic
Voting ("QV"), everyone may buy as many votes as she wants, but the
price a voter pays is the square of the number of votes that she casts.
One vote costs $1, two votes cost $4, and so on. A project is approved if
the votes in favor exceed the votes against. The money that is collected
is returned to all voters on a pro rata basis.
Suppose, for example, that the government announces a
proposal to build a park in the center of town. Every member of the
town is given the right to vote for or against the proposal. People who
live in the center of town strongly favor the park. Some of them spend
$100 for ten votes; others $81 for nine votes, $121 for eleven votes, or
even more. People who live farther from the center are less
enthusiastic about the use of tax dollars for a park that they will
rarely be able to visit. Some of them favor the park but only slightly;
they buy one vote for $1 or two votes for $4. Others do not buy any
votes at all or spend a few dollars to oppose the park. And then there
are some people who strongly object to this use of taxpayer dollars.
They spend $100 for ten votes against the park, $144 for twelve votes,
and so on. The government counts up the votes: if the proposal
receives a majority of votes, it is approved. The money that is collected
is then distributed back to people pro rata. For example, if one
thousand people live in town, and $10,000 is collected, then everyone
receives $10 back. This means that people who spend (say) $9 for
three votes (for or against) will end up netting $1. Thus, people who
oppose or support the park only slightly are fully compensated even if
they lose. People who spend more money are partially compensated.
To understand why the voter should pay the square of the
number of votes she paid rather than some other amount (such as the
cube or some other power), consider Table 1, which shows the cost of
126. Lalley & Weyl, supra note 14, at 6.
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voting under QV and includes the marginal cost-the additional
amount that a voter must pay to cast an additional vote. 127
Table 1: Total and Marginal Cost of Voting Under QV
Votes [ota6 Cost Marginal Cost
1 1 1
2 4 3
3 9 5
4 16 7
5 25 9
6 36 11
7 49 13
8 64 15
16 256 31
32 1024 63
As can be easily seen, the marginal cost of casting a vote is
always (within $1)128 proportionate to the number of votes cast. It
costs twice as much at the margin to cast four votes than to cast two
votes ($7 rather than $3); twice as much to cast eight votes than to
cast four votes ($15 rather than $7); twice as much to cast sixteen
votes than to cast eight votes ($31 rather than $15); and so on.
Rational agents maximize their utility by setting marginal cost
equal to marginal benefit. This means that if John values being able
to incrementally move the outcome in his favor twice as much as Sue
values being able to incrementally move the outcome in her favor,
John will pay twice as much at the margin as Sue does. For example,
John buys sixteen votes while Sue buys eight votes. The exact number
of votes that John and Sue buy depends on their estimates of how
likely it is that they will be pivotal voters, as explained below, so if
John buys sixteen votes for $256 (162), this does not mean that he
values the project at $256. But it does mean that he values the project
twice as much as Sue, who buys eight votes. The government can thus
determine which group of people-the supporters or opponents-is
willing to pay more in aggregate for the project even though it does
not know how much any individual (or the group) values the project.
127. The marginal cost is the cost of casting n votes minus the cost of casting n-1 votes. For
example, the marginal cost of casting the fifth vote is the cost of casting five votes ($25) minus
the cost of casting four votes ($16), which equals $9.
128. An artifact of the numerical example, not a feature of the model. The voter gains the
marginal benefit from casting a vote times the number of votes cast (MB * v), and pays the
square of the number of votes cast (v2). Setting marginal benefit equal to marginal cost, v' =
MB/2. Accordingly, the number of votes that a voter casts will be proportionate to her marginal
benefit. The result is driven by the fact that the derivative of a quadratic equation is linear.
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Crucially, QV gives weight both to numerosity and the intensity of
interests. A large group of people with weak preferences might outvote
a very small group of people with intense preferences but not a
somewhat larger group of people with intense preferences.
QV works best with a large number of voters: the more voters
there are, the more accurately the system works. QV's efficiency relies
on all voters perceiving the chance of their changing the outcome with
an additional vote as the same. When the number of voters is large,
such a perception is (approximately) accurate. If it is small, it is less
so. With a small population, it becomes possible for people to have
different perceptions about the likelihood that an additional vote will
change the outcome (that is, the likelihood that there would otherwise
be a tie, in which case an additional vote is pivotal). For example, in a
small group that consists of a number of moderate voters on one side
of an issue and an extreme voter on the other side, the extreme voter
will believe that a tie is less likely than the moderate voters will. The
moderate voters assume that all voters are (on average) moderate and
so discount the possibility that anyone is extreme, while the extreme
voter knows that this is not the case because she knows that she is an
outlier. If the extreme voter cares more about the issue than the
moderate voters in aggregate, she will buy fewer votes relative to her
utility than is socially desirable, and QV will suffer the same bias
towards the majority that other democratic procedures entail, though
in a less severe form. If the situation were reversed and the extreme
voter cared less than the three others in total, a reversed failure could
occur. The three voters are overconfident and expect to win easily, but
the extremist knows that, because of her strong preferences and thus
her willingness to buy many votes, a tie is more likely than it appears.
In this case, QV could lead to dictatorship in the same manner as
standard vote buying. Despite this, simulation evidence indicates that
QV almost always outperforms majority rule.129
However, as the size of the group increases, the probability of
either of these problems arising becomes small because no individual
is capable of having much influence on the chance of a tie. In a large
enough group, everyone has the proper incentive to buy votes in a way
that reflects her honest appraisal of her likelihood of being pivotal. QV
is not perfectly efficient, only approximately so, with the
approximation growing more precise as the population grows larger,
and as the variance of the preferences of the members of the
129. Steven P. Lalley & E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Voting 30 (Oct., 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors).
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population declines.130 Both of these properties closely resemble those
of a well-functioning market in a market economy: if markets are not
thick enough, then large sellers or buyers may have market power
that prevents perfect competition. Simulations indicate that groups of
a few dozen will almost always produce efficient results. 131
QV addresses the problem of varying intensities of preferences
by giving those with stronger preferences a means of influencing the
outcome in proportion to the strength of their preferences. They may
still lose to the majority, but they will not lose to a majority with weak
preferences (unless the majority is extremely large). Majorities will
prevail over minorities-as they should-when the intensities of
everyone's preferences are similar. But when minorities have
sufficiently intense interests, they can protect their interests from
majority domination. Indeed, QV ensures optimal outcomes (with high
probability if there are many voters) if the goal is to maximize the
well-being of the group. Thus, it is superior to majority and
supermajority rule or any other voting rule, which cannot, except
extremely crudely, protect people with strong preferences. QV is also
superior to cost-benefit analysis because cost-benefit analysis cannot
incorporate private information about the intensity of nonmarket
preferences.
Figure 1 illustrates how QV works. The three straight lines
illustrate the expected benefits that three different people obtain from
a project. The lines slope upwards because the probability of
prevailing increases with the number of votes one casts. In the
example, person one obtains a marginal benefit of one-half from
prevailing; person two obtains a marginal benefit of one; and person
three obtains a marginal benefit of six-fifths. The curved line shows
the quadratic cost of voting, that is, the square of the number of votes
cast. Inspection shows that each person buys a number of votes in
proportion to the expected marginal benefit-person two buys twice as
many votes as person one, and person three buys six-fifths as many
votes as person two. Indeed, as noted before, they buy a number of
votes equal to half of their marginal benefit. By totaling up the votes
and awarding the decision to the majority, the government can
perfectly reflect the aggregation of their preferences.
130. At a rate of 1/lu or 1/n, depending on the distribution of values where n is the
population. See Lalley & Weyl, supra note 14, at 4 ("[llnefficiency dies off at a rate 1/n in any
equilibrium").
131. See Lalley & Weyl, supra note 129, at 17, 21.
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Figure 1: Relative Voting Power Under Quadratic Voting
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A further point is that because of the redistribution, the voters
who lose will be at least partly compensated. Recall that under QV,
the money that is paid in is returned to members of the group on a pro
rata basis. This means that members of an outvoted minority will
receive some money back. Those with relatively weak preferences, who
therefore did not buy many votes, are likely to be fully compensated,
while those with stronger preferences will be only partly compensated.
While it might be better if they were fully compensated, full
compensation is not practical. Moreover, partial compensation is
superior to no compensation, which is the outcome under majority
rule, and to excessive compensation, which is the outcome when a
large minority demands a huge payoff in return for its consent to a
project that benefits the majority.
We can illustrate this with an example. Imagine a group of
thirty people, divided into three groups of ten people with identical
preferences.1 3 2 Anne (whose preferences are identical to those of
everyone in the first group) obtains 1600 from a project; Bruce loses
800; and Carla loses 400. Under majority rule, Bruce and Carla would
132. We assume ten of each time because, as noted above, QV works better with a large
number of people than with a few. But in our discussion of the example, we focus on the three
different representative agents.
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outvote Anne even though Anne's gain is greater than their combined
losses. Under QV, Anne buys eight votes in favor while Bruce buys 4
votes against and Carla buys 2 votes against-in all cases, because
under QV a voter buys a number of votes equal to half her expected
marginal benefit, which in this example is assumed to reflect
everyone's estimate that there is a one in one hundred chance of being
the pivotal voter. Table 2 shows that, under QV, Anne would pay
enough to outvote Bruce and Carla eight to six. The penultimate
column shows how the redistribution works, and the last column
shows each person's net payoff.
Table 2: An Example
Marginal 
o 
NVoter Benefit eeI Votes CSt. Share  let-
Anne 1600 16 8 Pro $64 $28 $1600-64+28=$1564
(10)
Bruce -800 -8 4 Con $16 $28 -$800-16+28= -$788
(10)
Carla -400 -4 2 Con $4 $28 -$400-4+28= -$376
(10)
QV 8-6: $400
Pro
Majority 2-1: -$400
Rule Con
Observe that QV produces the optimal outcome because Anne
(and her nine doppelgangers) values the project more than Bruce and
Carla (and their doppelgangers) disvalue it. Under majority rule, by
contrast, the project is defeated. QV generates a surplus of $400 over
majority rule. The sharing rule reduces the variance of the outcome,
though not by very much in this particular example.
C. A Real-World Example: Proposition 8
Let's now consider a real example. Proposition 8 was the
California ballot initiative that banned gay marriage in 2008.133
Proposition 8 became law because it received majority approval, fifty-
two percent to forty-eight percent of those voting.1 34 Proposition 8
133. See, e.g., Dan Morain, Marriage Fight to Be Costly; Backers and Foes of an Initiative
Banning Gay Unions Raise Millions, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/
jun/29/local/me-money29, archived at http://perma.cc/3V87-VK5F; see also California Proposition
8, supra note 84.
134. Tamara Audi, Justin Scheck & Christopher Lawton, Votes for Prop 8, WALL ST. J., Nov.
5, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122586056759900673.
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almost surely burdened a minority-specifically, gays and lesbians
who might want to marry-more than it benefited the majority, who
may have seen moral or religious positions vindicated but were not
otherwise directly affected by whether same-sex marriages existed or
not.
Some back-of-the-envelope calculations can illustrate the
argument.1 35 Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender ("LGBT") voters
constituted about four percent of California's population in 2010, while
same-sex couples constituted about 0.7 percent of households. This
calculation assumes that the average same-sex couple would pay
$100,000 for the right to marry, based on the fact that the average
marriage ceremony costs $25,000 and LGBT couples are on average
wealthier than heterosexual couples. This calculation also assumes
that single LGBT voters would pay $20,000 for the option to marry a
same-sex person. This implies aggregate willingness-to-pay by LGBT
voters to defeat Proposition 8 was $57 billion. 136 Assuming all LGBT
voters voted against Proposition 8, then among heterosexuals, the vote
was fifty-two percent to forty-four percent, implying a margin of
3,040,000 supporters of Proposition 8. Assuming supporters and
opponents have similar preference intensities, the residual supporters
would have to have been willing to pay $18,750 each, assuming non-
LGBT opponents were willing to pay the same amount, in order for
Proposition 8 to have been welfare-maximizing. This seems most
unlikely. In California, the median household income was $61,021 in
2008.137 It is hard to believe that people who are deeply opposed to
same-sex marriage would pay almost a third of their income to block
it. For this reason, Proposition 8 seems like a clear example of tyranny
of the majority, where a majority with weak preferences prevails over
a minority with strong preferences.
If we assume more realistically that the marginal eight percent
of supporters would have been willing to pay on average $6,000 to ban
same-sex marriage, while the (approximately) four percent of
opponents would have been willing to pay on average $20,000, then
the opponents would outvote the supporters under QV. Suppose, for
example, that everyone thought the probability of affecting the
outcome by buying a vote is one-tenth of one percent. Then the
supporters would buy three votes (6,000*.001*0.5) for $9, and the
135. Taken from Lalley & Weyl, supra note 129, at 5.
136. (38,000,000 * 0.007 * 100,000) + (38,000,000 * 0.04 * 20,000) = 57,000,000,000.
137. Jessica Semega, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME FOR STATES: 2007
AND 2008 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEYS, 4 (2009), available at https://www.census.gov/prod/
2009pubs/acsbr08-2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NYU2-RZGY.
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opponents would buy ten votes for $100. The opponents would outvote
the supporters by almost two to one even though there were only half
as many opponents.
One might object that people's willingness-to-pay is beside the
point; either there is a right to same-sex marriage or there is not.
Moreover, QV would not have blocked Proposition 8 if the gay and
lesbian population were too small or too poor, or supporters'
preferences were sufficiently strong. This might seem unjust.
But this objection puts the cart before the horse. Rights will be
recognized only if there is sufficient political or institutional support
for them. Gays and lesbians do better in a QV system than under
majority or supermajority rule because the intensity of their
preferences regarding matters close to their everyday lives will exceed
the intensity of the moral or ideological preferences of the average
voter. QV, unlike the other systems, allows preference intensity to
affect political outcomes. Judicial enforcement of rights will protect
gays and lesbians only if judges are persuaded to do so, and that will
happen only if judges with the favorable ideological preferences are in
office. In practice, judges do not protect all minorities (there is no way
to do that) or even the minorities who most need protecting. They
protect minorities who participated in the majority coalition that
appointed the judges a generation or so earlier. So in some eras,
judges appointed by Democratic presidents protect African-Americans,
poor people, and other constituents of the Democratic Party, while in
other eras, judges appointed by Republican presidents protect
creditors, property-owners, gun owners, and other constituents of the
Republican Party. If QV had been in place in 2008, Proposition 8 likely
would never have passed, and supporters of same-sex marriage would
not have had to wait until 2013 for the courts to overturn the law.138
Indeed, if QV had been in place earlier, then a ballot proposition
legalizing same-sex marriage probably would have been passed before
2008.
QV protects minorities by giving people with intense interests
that are disregarded by the majority a chance to affect political
outcomes, but it does not fully displace judicial review. Someone must
enforce the rules of the game, and courts play that function in our
society. QV would have been useless against Jim Crow because blacks
138. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (holding that petitioners
lacked standing to challenge the district court's ruling that Proposition 8 violated the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses (citing Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921
(N.D. Cal. 2010))); see also Perry v. Brown, 725 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2013) (dissolving a stay of the
district court's order two days after the Supreme Court's decision).
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in the south were disenfranchised: being disenfranchised under QV is
no better than being disenfranchised under a traditional voting
system, though, as we discuss below, QV does dramatically reduce or
eliminate the incentive for such disenfranchisement. Moreover,
various theories of judicial review-for example, that it is necessary to
protect fundamental values-may be unaffected by our argument. But
judicial review would become significantly less important if a system
of QV is in place.
D. Would the Rich Exert Too Much Influence Under Quadratic Voting?
QV offers more influence to those with substantial financial
resources than they could obtain under simply majority rule. The rich
are willing to pay more for any given nonfinancial good than are the
poor because money is worth less to them. One might therefore worry
that a society governed by QV would be inequitable. In this Section,
we show that from the standpoint of equity, QV is likely to be superior
to a society employing one-person-one-vote majority rule.
1. Pure Transfers
One possible concern is that rich people will buy votes to
support monetary transfers from poor to rich. This will not happen,
however. While the rich are willing to pay more to obtain nonfinancial
goods than are the poor, they are not willing to pay more to obtain
money. Consider a scheme that took a dollar from every individual in
the bottom fifty percent of the income distribution and gave $50 to
every individual in the top one percent. A member of the top one
percent would not pay more than $49 to enact such a proposal, which
would give them seven votes each. Such a proposal could be defeated
by the bottom fifty percent, each buying half of a vote, which would
only cost him or her a quarter each. Robbing the poor to pay the rich
never prevails under QV.
QV blocks purely redistributive projects because it permits only
efficient projects, and redistributive projects are not efficient because
they do not generate wealth. Indeed, as we will see, QV permits
redistributive projects only to the extent that people care about
distribution. Because wealthier people do care about the poor1 39
(although maybe not enough), under QV they will support some
139. Charlotte Cavaill6 & Kris-Stella Trump, The Two Facets of Social Policy Preferences, 77
J. POL. 146, 147 (2015) (noting the rise of "other-oriented" perspectives, which see social welfare
programs as redistribution to the poor, not from the rich). This may be driven by altruism or fear
that the poor will cause trouble unless they are paid off.
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redistribution to the poor, just as they do under majority rule. By
contrast, because the poor do not-in their own minds or anyone
else's-benefit by giving their money to the rich, QV would not result
in redistribution to the rich.
2. Redistribution as Social Insurance
We can make this argument more rigorous by considering some
theories about why redistribution exists in the first place. One
influential economic view of the purpose of redistribution (or
progressive taxation), first put forward by Vickrey,1 40 is that taxation
is a form of social insurance. Taxes and transfers blunt risks that are
outside of any individual's control, providing her with valued
insurance against bad events like sickness and job loss. The problem,
however, is that taxes and transfers also blunt incentives to work and
improve oneself. The optimal tax-and-transfer system balances these
two factors: redistributing enough to protect people from the risk of
income loss while not so much as to excessively blunt incentives to be
productive.
One complication is that when people vote for tax-and-transfer
schemes, they already know something about themselves-including,
at least roughly, the risk that they may lose their jobs and benefit
from social insurance. To understand this problem, we can consider
three extreme cases. In the first case, suppose people know nothing
about themselves: they choose whether to support a social-insurance
scheme behind the veil of ignorance, before anyone makes any
investments to improve their human capital or knows whether they
will be lucky or unlucky in the lottery of life. In such a case, everyone
would support the optimal, behind-the-veil-of-ignorance tax policy that
maximizes utilitarian welfare. The reason is that a social insurance
scheme is a public good, and it is one that in this context gives
everyone an insurance policy for which she would be willing to pay.
This problem was studied by Mirrlees, 14 1 and while debate rages about
parameters that determine the optimal tax policy, most economists
believe it involves high and progressive taxes. 142 QV would produce
this outcome simply because it always chooses the welfare-maximizing
result.
140. See William Vickrey, Measuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to Risk, 13
ECONOMETRICA 319, 324-28 (1945).
141. J. A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV.
EcoN. STUD. 175, 175-76 (1971).
142. Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic
Research to Policy Recommendations, J. ECON. PERSP. Fall 2001, at 165, 166.
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In a second case, suppose that individuals are highly uncertain
about their earnings but all investments that determine these
earnings have already been made. In this case, there would be an
extremely strong temptation to impose one hundred percent taxation,
even though, having known this beforehand, no one would have made
any investment. This is a well-known time-consistency problem that
can easily lead to excessive taxation of accumulated capital, and most
countries avoid the temptation for such taxes because they know that
it will deter future investment. Democracies develop institutions like
courts to reduce the risk of time-inconsistent policies; also, if leaders
violate past commitments, they will not be trusted in the future. Thus,
countries usually pay off sovereign debt so that they can borrow again.
QV does not directly block time-inconsistent policies, but neither does
majority or supermajority rule. But QV, unlike those other rules, does
block time-inconsistent policies that are purely redistributive to the
majority (or supermajority).
In a third case, opposite to the second, one can imagine the
case where no investments have yet been made but everyone knows
exactly the realization of the factors outside of their control that
determine their destiny. In this case, insurance has no value to any
individual, and even though some individuals will favor higher taxes
for redistribution, such taxes have no efficiency benefits. In this case,
QV will favor eliminating redistributive taxation entirely.
However, this case is just as unrealistic as the second one. In
reality, some investments are sunk, and some uncertainty is realized,
but likely about roughly equal amounts of each, at least when
averaged over the population. In this setting, QV would produce the
optimal social-insurance plan covering the residual level of
uncertainty. Given the balance, it is likely the optimum would
resemble that in the first case, where agents choose the social-
insurance system behind the veil of ignorance.
By contrast, equilibrium in such a model under one-person-
one-vote majority-rule voting is indeterminate, or at least no one has
ever been able to derive a determinate outcome. The problem is that
any coalition of fifty-one percent of the population has an incentive to
choose policies that are highly disadvantageous to the other forty-nine
percent of the population. This coalition might be the bottom fifty-one
percent of the income distribution, in which case democracy may be
highly redistributive, expropriating the top forty-nine percent at the
revenue-maximizing rate. This rate will not be confiscatory because
beyond a certain point, taxation is counterproductive because of
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reduced effort. But Saez shows that this revenue-maximizing rate is
extremely high, upwards of eighty percent. 143 On the other hand, if the
coalition is the top fifty-one percent of the population, the incentive
will be to maximize the revenue extracted from the bottom forty-nine
percent and redistribute to the top fifty-one percent. That is, the
outcomes yielded by majority rule are hard to predict, as many
coalitions are possible. This fact is borne out by historical experience
of coalitions in democracies shifting from protecting the interests of
elites to attempting the redistribution of these elites' wealth.
One way to generate a more definite prediction is to restrict the
policies the government can implement. Meltzer and Richard
performed the most famous of such analyses. 144 They argue that a
government choosing a proportional tax rate and rebating the
proceeds evenly across the population will choose the tax to maximize
the preferences of the individual with median income.145 This outcome
may be more or less redistributive than the optimum that QV will
implement. If the median income is quite high relative to the mean (if
there is little inequality at the top end of the income distribution) but
many individuals are in dire poverty, Meltzer and Richard predict
that majority rule will lead to very little redistribution. However, QV
would lead to strong redistribution because the risk of falling into
extreme poverty would loom large enough in each individual's utility
calculus to blunt the opposition of the middle class to redistribution to
the poor. If there is little poverty but significant income inequality
towards the top of the distribution, then Meltzer and Richard would
predict more redistribution under a proportional tax regime than
under QV.
But such a linear tax and transfer system is only one way to
implement redistribution, and many, if not most, democracies do not
operate that way. For example, Holland argues that in most
developing countries formal state transfers do not reach the poor and
instead are targeted at the middle class that works in the formal
sector.1 46 In such settings, democracy will experience swings (based on
whether at a given time a majority is or is not covered by the formal
system) between "cozy" middle class regimes that harm the poor and
rich equally with high tax rates that sponsor generous pensions for
143. Emmanuel Saez, Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates, 68 REV. EcON.
STUD. 205, 223-25 (2001).
144. Allan H. Meltzer & Scott F. Richard, A Rational Theory of the Size of Government, 89 J.
POL. ECON. 914 (1981).
145. Id. at 924-25.
146. Alisha C. Holland, Redistributive Politics in Truncated Welfare States 3, 23 (Harvard
Univ. Dep't of Gov't Working Paper, 2013).
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the middle class, and "populist" governments that gut the state and
are supported by the wealthy and the poor while being opposed by the
middle class. This pattern fits the politics of many Latin American
countries. QV, by contrast, will consistently yield a moderate level of
formal benefits that trades off providing insurance to the middle
classes against the costs of inefficiency and undue burdens on the poor
and the wealthy.
Majority rule is not the ally of sensible, balanced egalitarian
policies it is often made out to be. Exactly what outcomes majority
rule favors is extremely sensitive to the particular coalitions that are
cobbled together to form a majority. Some of these coalitions will
produce outcomes that are more redistributive than what is optimal,
others less. Nearly all political outcomes will be unfair and inefficient.
This may explain why there is huge variation across democracies in
the distribution of wealth. It is simply a mistake to assume that
majority systems with one-person-one-vote must lead to an equitable
distribution. QV, by contrast, consistently favors the optimum that
balances the benefits of social insurance against the deadweight loss
created by excessive taxation.1 47
3. Altruism of the Rich
Redistribution of wealth may also be motivated by altruism by
the wealthy or middle class or by related concerns, for example, that
inequality is a source of social instability. Under this assumption, a
transfer of wealth is just a public good.148 Because QV generates
efficient outcomes, it will produce such a public good, leading to some
degree of redistribution to the poor. By contrast, one-person-one-vote
majority rule does not lead to efficient outcomes, as we have
explained. A large minority that passionately seeks to use tax receipts
to fund poor relief can easily be outvoted by a small majority that does
not care, or cares very little, about the poor. Accordingly, along this
dimension (and putting aside reasons why majority rule could lead to
excessive redistribution discussed in the prior Section), QV should
lead to a more equitable outcome.
147. Subject to the time-consistency and partial failure of the veil-of-ignorance problems, as
discussed above.
148. See, e.g., James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of
Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 465-73 (1990) (modeling altruism as a warm glow with
implications for the supply of public goods).
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4. Biased Projects and Laws
One might also worry that even if QV does not produce
monetary transfers from the poor to the rich, it will generate projects
that the rich favor and the poor disfavor. For example, one might
imagine that a city that uses QV would fund yachting marinas and
public art rather than parks, and pothole repair on streets in rich
neighborhoods and not streets in poor neighborhoods. The rich would
pay more for votes than the poor, and this would cause a bias in favor
of public projects that the rich prefer.
There are several reasons for doubting that the rich would
have excessive power under QV. First, the rich as a group do not have
influence if they are on both sides of an issue, as they often are. 49 And
quadratic pricing minimizes the impact of large wealth disparities
because the cost per vote grows proportionally with the number of
votes bought. A rich person who sought to outvote one thousand poor
people would need to spend more than $1 million if each poor person
spent $1 for one vote.
Second, while the rich exercise greater influence, they must
pay for it, just as they do in the private market, and the money will
end up in the pockets of those who are not rich. Indeed, the very poor,
who are indifferent to many public projects and therefore often do not
vote, will likely do better under QV than under the current system
because the rich and middle class must, in effect, pay the poor
whenever they vote. Under majority rule, a poor person can exercise
theoretical influence over same-sex marriage by voting but is not
likely to do so; under QV, that person at least receives money in
return for yielding influence to others, and she can use this money to
buy goods and services she values more intensely than her share of a
public project (such as food and clothing). By allowing the wealthy to
obtain greater influence over public goods, about which they care
more, and by transferring to the poor greater influence over private
goods (in the sense of giving them money through the QV process
which they can use to buy goods and services they need), QV would
likely improve rather than reduce distributive justice. In effect, QV
149. For example, on climate change. See Clare O'Connor, Liberal Billionaires Take on the
Koch Brothers in California Energy Fight, FORBES, Oct. 12, 2010, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
clareoconnor/2010/10/12/liberal-billionaires-take-on-the-koch-brothers-in-california-energy-fight/.
See Stuart N. Soroka & Christopher Wlezien, On the Limits to Inequality in Representation, 41
PS: POL. SCl. & POL. 319, 319-25 (2008). But see Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels, & Jason
Seawright, Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51,
63-68 (2013) (discussing evidence showing that the wealthiest Americans exert considerable
influence and tend to be on the same side of any given issue).
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gives poor individuals a new asset (the power to influence the
allocation of public goods) that they can sell to the rich in return for
money that they need more than the influence.
Many public projects-among them, New York's Central Park
and Chicago's Millennium Park-reflect the preferences of the
wealthy who partly finance the projects in return for influence over
their design. Millennium Park contains sophisticated artwork to a far
greater degree than an ordinary public park. Poor people benefit both
from the public good and the fact that they do not need to pay for as
much of it out of their taxes. We must compare QV to the status quo or
a reasonable approximation of it, and under the status quo the rich
exert greater influence over public projects by financing a
disproportionate share of them-an arrangement that may not be
optimal or ideal but seems to be mutually beneficial. QV would
institutionalize this process and make it more transparent and fair.
Indeed, it is far from obvious that QV would increase the
influence of the wealthy compared to the status quo, where the
wealthy already have a variety of means to buy influence through
lobbying, campaign spending, and similar activities. 150 These
pathways to influence would be greatly dampened by QV. The reason
is that, under the current system, people who want to exert influence
target the swing voters, that is, the people who do not care and thus
can be moved to change their vote on the basis of relatively small
expenditures on advertising. Under QV, there is no reason to target
the people in the middle because those people will not buy very many
votes even if they are shifted over at the margin. Influencers would
use their money to target more passionate people because those people
spend a lot of money on their marginal vote. Their financial interest
may make them more susceptible to reasoned argument.
Much of government policy already reflects the influence of
wealthy people because of the nature of cost-benefit analysis, which is
routinely used by agencies. Cost-benefit analysis is based on the
150. For evidence, see Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB.
OPINION Q. 778, 783-93 (2005) (showing how government policy typically benefits the very well
off). The problem has been exacerbated by Supreme Court decisions that have limited the power
of the government to regulate campaign contributions and spending. See, e.g., McCutcheon v.
FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976). But the original campaign finance regulations that were struck down had only
ambiguous effect. The problem is that donations are not just a means for people with intense
preferences to affect political outcomes but also give an advantage to the wealthy. Thus,
restricting the use of wealth has ambiguous welfare consequences. An interesting proposal to
require anonymity of donations would reduce the incidence of quid pro quos but would not
address the larger problem. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 181-223 (2002).
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willingness-to-pay of people affected by the policy, which in turn is
based on their market behavior. 151 If rich people care more about clean
air than poor people, and so are willing to pay more for it, then
environmental regulations will cut pollution in a way that reflects rich
people's preferences more than poor people's preferences. 15 2 While
some believe that this is unfair, it seems likely that preferences among
the rich and poor do not in practice vary enough to make a difference
in government policy choices. If this is so, then QV would also not
favor the rich over the poor.
Third, the social consequence of walling off the public sphere
from efficiency is often not to make the public sphere "fairer" but to
shrink it. Cities where majority rule does not provide the wealthy
means to express their willingness-to-pay to keep streets clean and
safe and to create public infrastructure are plagued by what John
Kenneth Galbraith in The Affluent Society called "the social
imbalance," where people emerge from Rolls Royces and Trump
Towers to walk along potholed streets. 153 The social imbalance
similarly leads to inaction on the international stage on global issues,
like climate change and genocide. 154 Those, often on the left, who
believe in an active public sphere should not seek to defend a false
egalitarianism that impoverishes the public sphere.
Finally, if one rejects all of these arguments, a version of QV
can still offer significant gains even without deviating at all from
egalitarian norms in elections. In a race with more than two
candidates, or more than two issues, individuals could be allocated
equal sums of an artificial currency that they could use to
quadratically buy votes on individual issues. This would allow
individuals to give up influence on issues they care less about to gain
greater influence on issues they care more about. By allowing people
to express the intensity of their preferences, the process would help
address many of the paradoxes and incoherencies of democracy that
arise because standard voting systems that registers all interests as
equally important. 155 In fact, greater efficiency gains could be achieved
151. Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 DUKE L.J. 385, 396-400
(2004).
152. In principle, cost-benefit analysis values the lives of rich people more than the lives of
poor people. W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1912, 1913-17 (1993); see also Sunstein, supra note 151, at 423-26 (discussing cost-benefit
analysis in relation to poverty and mortality values). Note, however, that regulatory agencies use
a uniform valuation.
153. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 252, 264 (1958).
154. ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 169-89 (2010).
155. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951)
(examining the possibility of creating a procedure for aggregating individual preferences in the
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if individuals were allowed to save these tokens across elections,
devoting more to elections where they cared more. Another possibility
would be to reduce the influence of the wealthy by making individuals
pay a quadratic fraction of their gross adjusted federal income rather
than a quadratic number of dollars for influence. While both of these
systems would achieve smaller efficiency gains than would QV using
money, they could still greatly improve on simple majority rule.
It is important, as always, to compare QV with the existing
political system or realizable variations of it, not with an unattainable
ideal. In existing polities, the wealthier have more influence than the
less wealthy because they can make campaign donations, take
advantage of contacts, and so on. Under QV, this advantage would be
both reduced and channeled more productively.
E. Quadratic Voting in Representative Democracy
The system of QV discussed in this Article so far resembles a
referendum. People vote directly for a proposal by buying votes using
the quadratic price. But referenda are rare in large countries, which
(if they are democratic) rely on representative institutions. This raises
the question how QV would work in a representative democracy.
Voting for representatives under a system of QV could take
different forms. In the interest of space, this Article sketches out a
possible approach but leaves the details for future research. Consider
a system in which voters buy votes for candidates for office by paying
a quadratic price, with the money returned to voters pro rata. The QV
system would operate at the level of the office-at the district level for
representatives, at the state level for senators, and at the national
level for the president. The theory behind QV applies to
representatives in the same way that it applies to projects. Under the
QV system, the representative will be chosen whose expected
performance maximizes the aggregate well-being of voters. Knowing
this, candidates will select positions that maximize the welfare of
process of making social choices); NICOLAS DE CONDORCET, POLITICAL WRITINGS (Steven Lukes &
Nadia Urbinati eds., 2012) (including an analysis of voting that would later serve as a basis for
social choice theory); Allan Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, 41
ECONOMETRICA 587 (1973) (analyzing whether strategic voting can be eliminated in significant
voting systems not involving an element of chance); Mark Allen Satterthwaite, Strategy-
Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures
and Social Welfare Functions, 10 J. ECON. THEORY 187 (1975) (examining strategy-proof voting
procedures).
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their constituents, just as they choose positions maximizing the
preferences of the median voter under majority rule.1 56
Applying QV to voting in a representative body requires an
additional step. It would make little sense for legislators to put their
own money at stake when voting. Instead, legislators should commit
their constituents' money when they vote on bills. Suppose, for
example, that a set amount of money collected through taxes is sent
back to districts (and states) at the end of every year. The amount of
money legislators have committed through QV during that year is
subtracted from that payment. Legislators would reflect their
constituents' interests faithfully so that they are reelected, and the
legislators' own votes would be aggregated efficiently.
Consider, for example, a vote on whether the U.S. government
should go to war with a foreign country. Legislators would vote by
committing their constituents' money. If the legislators are faithful
agents, passionate backers and opponents of the war would end up
paying more money than people who are indifferent or close to
indifferent. The redistribution of the money would blunt the impact,
but there would still be monetary winners and losers. Anticipating
these costs and benefits, voters would elect and sanction their
representatives using money from their own pockets.
Representative institutions face the same problem of
preference aggregation that exists in the referendum-style votes
discussed in the last Section. Each representative serves a different
group of constituents who have different interests. A particular bill
will affect those groups in different ways-some greatly, others hardly
at all. This means that representatives who seek reelection will also
vary in their interests in passage of the bill. A majority of
representatives who weakly oppose a bill may thus be able to outvote
a minority of representatives who strongly favor it, reflecting the
distribution of interests in the broader population. Therefore, there is
a constant danger that one-person-one-vote majority rule in
representative bodies will lead to socially bad outcomes.
Representatives avoid these outcomes by logrolling: legislators
are given pet projects in their districts in return for supporting
national legislation.15 7 While many observers criticize such practices
as corrupt, 58 it is important to remember that many landmark
156. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy, 65 J. POL.
ECON. 135, 137 (1957); see also John 0. Ledyard, The Pure Theory of Large Two-Candidate
Elections, 44 PUB. CHOICE 7, 10-19 (1984).
157. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 104-12 (2003).
158. See Nicholas R. Miller, Logrolling, Vote Trading, and the Paradox of Voting: A Game-
Theoretical Overview, 30 PUB. CHOICE 51, 62-69 (1977); see also Dana Milbank, Republican
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legislative achievements never could have been accomplished without
logrolling. For example, New Deal legislation and civil rights laws
would not have been passed but for logrolling.1 5 9
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which was
needed to address the financial crisis, was initially blocked in the
House. Leaders were only able to pass the bill after arranging for a
range of payoffs, including a reduction in the depreciation schedule for
improvements to restaurant buildings; extension of tax credits for
solar energy installations; and tax exemptions or subsidies for a
number of entities such as film and television producers, rum
producers in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, racing track
facilities, manufacturers of wool products, and manufacturers of toy
wooden arrows.160 Of course, logrolling is not always, or even usually,
efficient, and it is typically done through wasteful pet projects, not
through direct and therefore efficient exchanges of tax payments
across districts. 161 QV would offer a more rational, efficient, and fair
means of allowing the incentive to "bring home the pork" to be
weighed against national interests. It would thus channel existing
corrupt (or at least unseemly) but necessary wheel-greasing into
socially efficient bargaining.
What about the risk that wealthy people will buy their way
into elected office by purchasing votes for themselves? Just like today,
rich people will have an advantage under QV. But while rich people
under the current system can improve their electoral prospects by
using personal funds to buy advertising, rich people under QV would
use their funds to buy votes, with their money being redistributed to
the nonrich, rather than being wasted on advertisements. Moreover,
because of the square function, QV would not give even very rich
people a serious advantage. An illustrative example is Silvio
Berlusconi. Under QV he could, with E2.5 billion (roughly half of his
net worth), buy 50,000 votes in a single election. 162 That would only
constitute less than 0.2 percent of the vote in the last Italian general
Lawmakers Blindsiding the Party's Conservative Base, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2014, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-republican-lawmakers-blindsiding-the-partys-
conservative-base/2014/01/29/cb9bd984-8930- 11e3-9 16e-e01534b1e l32 story.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/WUM4-4AKC.
159. See CARO, supra note 75.
160. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2012)).
161. See MUELLER, supra note 157, at 104-20 (discussing literature on logrolling).
162. The World's Billionaires, #185, Silvio Berlusconi & Family, FORBES, available at http://
www.forbes.com/profile/silvio-berlusconi/, archived at http://perma.cc/K2P2-8PUR (last visited
Jan. 5, 2015).
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election. 163 On the other hand, at present Berlusconi has managed to
win half a dozen elections in Italy, overwhelmingly because of the
influence of his wealth. Therefore, a very wealthy person, especially
one very wealthy person able to dominate the media, can have far
more influence through advertising than he or she could ever have
through QV.
QV is a more natural fit for referenda than for representative
institutions in the sense that QV-based referenda would require fewer
far-reaching changes to how political institutions work than QV-based
elections would. At the federal level in the United States, QV
institutions would require a constitutional amendment; however, at
local levels, experimentation is possible. Moreover, there are
numerous second-best type issues that this Article has not addressed.
The role of the presidential veto in such a system is obscure; it is
probably unnecessary. QV in representative assemblies would
probably make more sense in a parliamentary system than in a
presidential system.
F. Quadratic Voting, the Franchise, and Constitutional Stability
One of the major advantages of QV is that it should lead to
greater constitutional stability than exists under one-person-one-vote
majority rule. The latter system is famously vulnerable to
constitutional manipulation. Under a majority-rule system, the
majority can simply pass a law that disenfranchises the minority.
Whatever majority forms initially would be tempted to do this.
Democracies have developed numerous elaborate mechanisms to
prevent majorities from entrenching their power. For example, judges
strike down laws that disenfranchise minorities, and amendments to
constitutions typically require a supermajority. But if the democracy's
constitution is too hard to change, then large groups of people may
seek change through extraconstitutional means and experiment with
nondemocratic forms of government like dictatorship.
Under QV, only laws that are efficiency maximizing can pass.
This rules out any revision that replaces QV with a less efficient form
of governance. It would rule out, for example, returning from QV to
majority rule, or replacing QV with an oligarchy or dictatorship. While
the majority or other group might favor such a move, those against
163. Voter Turnout Data for Italy, INT'L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE,
available at http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=IT, archived at http://
perma.cc/W3SW-LAT3 (last updated Oct. 5, 2011).
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would oppose more strongly and those in favor more weakly, precisely
by the basic efficiency logic of QV.
Additionally, recall that QV is only approximately (with high
probability) efficient, and that the approximation is more accurate
when fewer individuals with outlier preferences oppose the efficient
proposals brought forward, relative to the status quo. As a result,
among all efficiency-enhancing measures, QV tends to favor those that
create the fewest and the least extreme losers relative to the status
quo, as the only thing that can defeat an efficient law under QV is the
strong opposition of an extreme opponent. Accordingly, QV will not
replace itself with a less efficient alternative, and, if QV replaces itself
with a (as yet undiscovered) more efficient alternative, it will do so in
the way that minimizes the redistribution across individuals that
occurs through the transition. Because no other practical and efficient
alternative to QV exists, 164 it seems highly unlikely such an efficient
alternative would arise. QV is the maximally constitutionally stable
form of governance.
One form of constitutional change, for example, to which QV is
resilient is the disenfranchisement of some subset of citizens. Even
more strongly, QV actually favors the enfranchisement of individuals
currently outside of the polity, so long as revenues are not shared with
them. The reason is that individuals included in the system will exert
influence on the decision only if they are willing to make transfers to
the rest of the polity that compensate the polity for the externalities
created by the newly enfranchised individual. A good analogy is again
the market economy: every country benefits by opening to free trade
because of the possibilities free trade offers to benefit from the
products of other countries. 165 Because QV, like free trade but unlike
standard voting systems, is a positive rather than zero-sum game, QV
will encourage broadening the sphere of political inclusion rather than
shrink it.
QV is also likely to be much more resilient to extrasystem
revolutionary upheavals than majority rule is. Such upheavals are
highly inefficient and so any system that maximizes aggregate utility
is likely to go to large lengths to avoid them. Democracies, also, go to
lengths to avoid them. However, it can easily be in the interest of a
narrow majority to risk such an upheaval in order to have a shot at
expropriating the other forty-nine percent of the population. This has
been the source of many violent regime changes: Pinochet overthrew
Allende for trying to use democracy to achieve radical redistribution,
164. See Lalley & Weyl, supra note 14, at 3.
165. DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE 28-69 (3d ed. 2009).
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and 66 many of Hitler's supporters voted for the Nazis because they
feared the redistributive threat posed by a growing Communist
party.167 This is clearly inefficient as it converts the redistribution that
democracy creates into an aggregate loss of efficiency. The prospect of
such an upheaval, on the other hand, will further reinforce the
tendency of QV to select, among all efficient social decisions, the one
that minimizes the maximum loss any individual receives relative to
the status quo. QV thus seems more likely to be stable against violent
overthrow than majority rule.
G. Other Objections to Quadratic Voting and Responses
1. Taboo Against Vote Buying
Vote buying is illegal in democratic countries. Indeed, there is a
taboo against it. As we are painfully aware, any suggestion that vote
buying should be legalized will be met with incredulity. However, it is
important to understand the source of the taboo and to see why it does
not apply to QV.
As we explained in Part II, in a system of one-person-one-vote
majority rule, such as ours, vote buying would not improve outcomes.
Instead, it would give excessive influence to people with the strongest
preferences and favor the rich. Accordingly, vote buying should be
illegal in a regular system of majority rule. By contrast, the type of
vote buying that takes place in QV does produce optimal social
outcomes, taking into account variations in the intensity of
preferences, as well as the number of people who hold particular
preferences. Further, QV does not favor the rich relative to the status
quo system. In fact, under QV, it would still be necessary to outlaw
extrasystem vote buying that could be used to undermine the
quadratic nature of costs by allowing one individual to buy votes as a
proxy for another.
It is useful to draw analogies to other settings in which
markets are not allowed to develop. For example, there is a taboo
against the sale of human organs to people who need transplants.
Instead, a complicated system based on need is used. 16 8 But these
taboos must be evaluated on their own merits. Debra Satz, for
166. See PAMELA CONSTABLE & ARTURO VALENZUELA, A NATION OF ENEMIES: CHILE UNDER
PINOCHET 24-27, 166-98 (1991) (detailing the differences in economic policy under Salvador
Allende and Augusto Pinochet in Chile).
167. See HARRIS, supra note 5.
168. Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 57, 58-83 (1989).
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example, opposes markets in human organs because she believes that
those markets harm the poor. 169 But QV should help the poor relative
to the current voting system. Others believe that certain norms
against buying and selling should not be disturbed because they
reflect important human values. But vote buying is permitted in the
corporate setting, 17 0 which suggests that the prohibition on vote
buying does not reflect some intrinsic moral constraint but instead
advances specific institutional values that vary by context. This is, in
fact, straightforward. Voting is just a procedure that takes place in a
larger institutional context that enables a group to make collectively
beneficial decisions. If vote buying advances the well-being of the
group, then it should be permissible.
2. Voting and Irrationality
Many have argued that because individuals have such a tiny
chance of being pivotal in elections, it is irrational for individuals to
vote.17 ' The argument we provided for the optimality of QV depends
on voter rationality. One might therefore wonder whether majority
rule might not be better than QV in dealing with such irrationality.
In fact, voter irrationality is not a problem for QV as long as
the irrationality is approximately uniform across individuals-more
specifically, as long as the irrationality is not correlated with the
utility that individuals gain from different laws or projects. Suppose,
for example, that people generally overestimate the probability of
being pivotal or vote for reasons unrelated to the specific gains from
an election such as a sense of civic duty. These factors will raise the
number of votes bought by most individuals, but maintain the
proportionality between vote bought and utility so long as they
operate in a reasonable manner that is uncorrelated with utility.
Irrationality would produce problems for QV only if, for example,
people who gain more from a political outcome systematically
overestimate (or underestimate) their probability of being pivotal,
while people who gain less from the political outcome do the opposite.
As far as we know, there is no evidence for such patterns.
169. DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS OF
MARKETS 205 (2010); see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS
OF MARKETS 43-93 (2012) (suggesting that the relevant inquiry regarding markets is "are there
some things that money cannot buy?"); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 97-115 (1983) (listing fourteen categories of "blocked exchanges"
which reflect areas in the United States where wealth is not dominant).
170. See Hu & Black, supra note 123.
171. See, e.g., ANDRA BLAIS, TO VOTE OR NOT TO VOTE: THE MERITS AND LIMITS OF RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY 144 (2000).
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In fact, under almost all of the standard models political
scientists use to explain voter turnout, QV actually performs better
when voters are not perfectly rational than when they are. The
approximate efficiency of QV becomes even more accurate as more
voters participate. Recall that the only way QV can lead to an
inefficient outcome is that a very extreme individual decides to "buy
the whole election." This is only possible because other individuals,
confident in the victory of the socially optimal outcome, do not buy
many votes. However if individuals irrationally buy a large number of
votes, the threat of such an extreme spoiler vanishes, as it becomes too
expensive for the spoiler to steal the election.
Meanwhile, while irrationality may explain why people vote as
often as they do under a system of majority rule, it cannot justify
majority rule relative to QV. Voter irrationality will increase the
amount of voting but not stop majorities from expropriating from
minorities.
3. Credit Constraints
We have argued above that, because the willingness of the rich
to pay for a dollar is not greater than the willingness of the poor to pay
for a dollar, monetary transfers from the poor to the rich would not be
a plausible outcome under QV. But, one might argue, the rich are
more able to afford to pay for votes in the short term. Even if the
willingness of the poor to pay is the same or greater, they might be
unable to get access to the cash in the short-run.
The logic of the square function, however, not only makes this
false but actually reverses the logic. Suppose that there is an issue up
for a vote favored by one person and opposed by ninety-nine that
would bring a benefit to the one person of $99 million and a harm to
the ninety-nine people of $1 million each. Suppose further that,
without the bill passing, the lifetime income of the beneficiary is $100
million and the lifetime income of those harmed is $1 million each.
Thus, one might think that the poor would have a hard time raising
the cash: they are being asked to decide on a project that could deprive
them of their lifetime wealth!
However, it is easy to see things are quite the reverse. In this
case, the chance that a marginal vote is pivotal will be roughly four-
thousandths of a percent. 17 2 This leads the beneficiary to want to buy
about 2,200 votes in favor and the opponents to want to buy twenty-
two votes against each. This would cost the proponent about $5
172. See Lalley & Weyl, supra note 14, at 6-15, for calculations.
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million and the opponents $500 each. That $5 million is five percent of
the lifetime income of the proponent while $500 is five-hundredths of a
percent of the lifetime income of each of the opponents. It seems wildly
implausible that it would be harder for each of these individuals to
come up with $500 than it would be for the proponent to come up with
$5 million. If individuals were irrational and perceived a greater
chance of their being pivotal, the calculation would be even more
lopsided.
4. Frivolous Voting
One might be concerned that the redistribution under QV could
give people an incentive to propose frivolous projects in order to force
votes and benefit from the redistribution. Suppose, for example, that a
person proposes that Illinois be sold to China. If the proposer does not
vote, while others vote (presumably) against the proposal, the
proposer will collect a share of the money spent for the votes. This
would be possible in principle if anyone were allowed to put anything
on the ballot. But that would not be a sensible way to set an agenda
for QV votes. The system we instead propose is one where items are
not placed up for votes unless they have sufficient support, the same
way a referendum does not go forward onto a ballot unless it has
collected sufficient signatures. Support under QV, though, would be
judged not by the number of signatures but by the total willingness-to-
pay to see the initiative on the ballot, as gauged by a QV initiative
process.
In particular, individuals could cast as many votes as they
want in support of the petition, paying the square of the number of
votes they cast. The funds given would be transferred on to votes for
the initiative if it made it onto the ballot. The item would be put up for
a vote only if some support threshold were reached, say, one percent of
the population in votes. This would ensure that no one could benefit
by forcing others to vote on an issue; they could only get an item on
the ballot by committing funds, which they would then be forced to
pay.
IV. CONCLUSION
Constitutional designers have struggled, with only limited
success, to create political institutions that advance the common good.
Authoritarian and oligarchic systems give a dictator or a ruling class
the responsibility of acting for the benefit of all, but fail to advance the
public good because the individual or elite has no incentives-other
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than the fear of revolution-to do so. Democracy provides a method for
the majority to influence outcomes directly, but it has never solved the
problem of how to account for the varying intensity of preferences.
Because majorities-both entrenched and temporary--can outvote
minorities with intense preferences, democratic outcomes can cause
more harm than good and can lead to conflict and political disruption.
Various efforts to respond to this problem by using different
voting rules or subjecting majority voting to constraints create
additional problems. Supermajority rules, including bicameralism,
cause gridlock, which harms everyone. Judicial enforcement of rights
can block good outcomes as well as bad outcomes. The most successful
countries have worked around institutional limitations, using
logrolling and campaign finance, for example, but these workarounds
are themselves costly, imperfect, and controversial.
We have argued that QV provides a third way. It allows
political institutions to aggregate preferences across both number of
people and intensity of preferences. It thus should lead to better
outcomes and less conflict. We know that wholesale replacement of
political institutions with QV will not occur anytime soon, but we do
believe that QV has enough promise that policymakers should
consider experimenting with it in carefully controlled settings.
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